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Rescuing Children from Abusive Parents:
The Constitutional Value of Pre-Deprivation
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MARK R. BROWN*
Over the course of the last generation, a growing number of states have
authorized (either defacto or dejure) warrantless rescues of children. Summary
removal is proper as long as one could reasonably believe the child has been, or
might be, abused. Child abuse is a categorical, constant emergency. Time and
circumstances are irrelevant. Federal courts have split over the constitutionality
of this practice. The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that state
officials cannot, as a rule, summarily remove children from their parents' care.
Instead, in the absence of particular "exigent circumstances," prior judicial
authorization is required. The First and Eleventh Circuits, meanwhile, have
ruled that traditional Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards do not apply
to child abuse investigations. Priorjudicial authorization is not needed, peculiar
exigencies are immaterial. This Article addresses the history, constitutionality,
and wisdom of rescuing children from their homes without prior judicial
authorization. It argues that Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment limitations,
which generally require some sort ofpriorjudicial process, apply to child abuse
investigations. Prior judicial process should, thus, only be excused under a
traditional "exigent circumstances" exception-only when time and
circumstances preclude officials from seeking a warrant or court order
I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone agrees that abused children should be protected from their abusers.
Protection, in turn, often requires that children be physically separated from their
natural guardians, who either are guilty of abuse themselves or house the abusers.
But how should separation take place? Should it be an immediate rescue? Should
judges be asked, ex ante, about the need for and propriety of governmental
intervention? Or should executive officials have discretion to act when they
believe children are in harm's way?
A common attitude among law enforcement officers is that judges hurt more
than they help. The bottom line, they argue, is that judges slow investigations,
delay apprehensions, and generally benefit criminals. But for judges' insistence
on probable cause, warrants, sworn statements, and other technicalities, more
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criminals would be brought to justice. Constitutional restrictions, primarily those
found in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, are anathema to law
enforcement.
This same view permeates child abuse investigations. Because judges do
more harm than good, it is better to avoid judicial process altogether-or at least
delay it until after the child is separated from his abusers. Post-deprivation
process, the argument goes, is better-suited to the ultimate goal of protecting
children. Pre-rescue review risks more abuse.
A significant number of states today embrace this logic. Even when time and
circumstances would otherwise permit prior judicial review, these states authorize
immediate, warrantless rescues of children believed to have been abused. They
employ a categorical presumption that all children in potentially abusive
environments face a substantial and immediate risk of harm. Given this risk,
judges need not first be consulted. Mistakes can be sorted out later.
Federal courts today have split over the propriety of rescuing children without
prior judicial authorization.' The Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
concluded that state officials cannot, as a rule, unilaterally remove children from
their parents' care. Instead, in the absence of true "exigent circumstances," prior
judicial authorization is required. 2 The First and Eleventh Circuits, meanwhile,
have reached a contrary result.3 They have held that traditional Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment limitations do not apply to child abuse investigations. 4
Consequently, police and social workers can immediately rescue children without
bothering to seek judicial assistance. Time and circumstances are irrelevant.
This Article addresses the constitutionality and wisdom of rescuing children
from their homes without prior judicial authorization. The Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments generally require that significant governmental invasions into
people's lives be preceded by some form of process. 5 The thought (and hope) is
that by testing the credibility of the government's actions beforehand, prior
process will avert mistakes and otherwise avoid unnecessary invasions. While this
process need not always be formal, for important personal interests, like privacy
in one's home, the Court has ordinarily required some level of judicial oversight.6
My thesis is that one's family, being at least as important as one's home, ought to
receive similar protections.
Justifying this conclusion is not a simple task. Students know the Fourth
Amendment admits numerous exceptions and, viewed as a whole, makes little
sense. The same goes for the procedural protections found in the Fourteenth
I See infra notes 132-78 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 140-78 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 93-138 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 93-138 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 525-38 and accompanying text.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause. In particular, those suspected of criminal
offenses-children included-can be arrested outside their homes without
warrants. 7 Children, as well as adults, can be temporarily detained, without prior
court order, when reasonably believed to be dangerous to themselves or others.8
Why should temporary rescues be treated differently?
Answering these objections requires tackling several related subjects,
including the laws of arrest, delinquency, and civil commitment. I argue that
inconsistent applications of constitutional principles in these areas can largely be
explained by differing histories and policies. I consequently devote a large part of
this Article to comparing the law of rescue and removal with that of arrest and
commitment. Toward this end, Part II of this Article briefly describes the law of
removal and the two differing paths states and lower federal courts have taken in
terms of rescue.9 Part Ill provides an historical account of rescue's evolution,
from colonial times to the emergence of the modem welfare state.10 Part IV draws
what I believe are natural comparisons to the laws of arrest and commitment.'l
Armed with these comparisons, histories, and policies, Part V then attempts to
sort out a reasoned explanation for why prior judicial authorization ought to prove
the norm in the context of child abuse. 12
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RESCUE AND REMOVAL
"Removal" is the formal process by which a child is physically and legally
separated from his parents. Precise reasons for removal may differ from case to
case, but generally tend to converge on a single principle: protecting children
from physical and emotional harm. Children at risk, in turn, are commonly
labeled "neglected" or "abused."
Removal includes not only an initial "rescue," whereby the child is
tentatively-perhaps temporarily-taken from the home, but also a host of
intermediary steps, like foster care, that are designed to ensure the child's safety.
Ultimately, removal can lead to a complete termination of parental rights. For
purposes of this Article, I use the term "rescue" to describe the initial, tentative
seizure of the child. "Removal" is used generically to describe the full process
that is aimed at protecting children from their parents.
Removal is largely regulated by the individual states. At least since 1974,
however, when Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA), the federal government has revealed a modicum of interest in the child
7 See infra notes 314-18 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 349-408 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 13-178 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 179-255 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 256-415 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 416-541 and accompanying text.
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abuse phenomenon. CAPTA, which vaguely tied federal grants to states' child
protection programs, 13 was followed in 1980 and 1997 by two additional federal
spending measures, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 14 (1980 Act)
and the Adoption and Safe Families Act15 (1997 Act). The 1980 Act conditioned
federal funding on states making "reasonable efforts" to correct familial problems
before terminating parental rights.16 The 1997 Act, in turn, continued to require
reasonable efforts to maintain and restore families, but also finessed the 1980
Act's language to facilitate and encourage adoption. 17 While it is arguable that the
federal "reasonable efforts" command includes encouraging pre-rescue judicial
oversight when possible, no court to date has construed the 1980 and 1997 Acts in
this fashion. The unwavering assumption has been that federal statutes and
regulations do not limit when or how children can be rescued from their parents.
State rescue laws today, though differing in their specific language, tend to
agree that "probable cause" offers the proper standard for temporarily rescuing
children from their homes. As with criminal law, probable cause is not equated
with certainty, or even likelihood, of abuse. 18 Instead, the question is simply
whether the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe
that a child has been, is being, or might be abused. 19 If so, the child can be
temporarily taken, pending a more thorough review when time permits. Only later
13 See Howard A. Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's End, 33
FAM. L.Q. 765, 767 (1999) (noting that CAPTA marked Congress's "first direct action to
address child maltreatment within the home").
14 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500.
15 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
16 See Michael T. Dolce, A Better Day for Children: A Study of Florida's Dependency
System with Legislative Recommendations, 25 NOVA L. REv. 547, 556 (2001) (observing that
the "Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA")... sought to better
ensure that children are only removed from their families of origin if 'reasonable efforts' are
made to prevent the need for removal").
17 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITEE
ON HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
FOSTER CARE-STATES' EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE
FAmiLUES ACT 1 (Dec. 1999), http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00001 .pdf (last visited Sept.
19, 2004) (explaining that the 1997 Act "clariflies] the circumstances under which states are not
required to try to prevent a child's removal from home or to return a foster child home [and
therefore] allows states to forgo services to preserve or reunite the biological family") (citations
omitted).
18 See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, J. ISRAEL & N. KING, CRMNAL PROCEDURE 146 (3d ed.
2000) (observing that probable cause in criminal cases speaks to "probabilities").
19 This is not to say that the probable cause standard for civil rescue and removal is the
same as that for criminal search and seizure. It may be that the former is less demanding than
the latter. See LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 18, at 148 (observing that in civil matters, the
probable cause standard may be reduced). This matter, however, lies beyond the scope of this
Article.
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must the state prove (by clear and convincing evidence2°) that parents are
"unfit"21 and that their rights should be terminated. Until this happens, probable
cause provides sufficient reason to rescue and keep a child from his parents.
As might be expected, judicial oversight is built into all states' removal
systems. Like criminal cases, however, hearings and investigations can take
weeks, months, and (sometimes) years. All states agree that parents are entitled to
judicial review throughout this process. No one today would dare claim that
parental rights can or should be terminated without some sort of judicially
supervised, contested hearing. Parents must, at a minimum, be afforded an
opportunity to challenge the termination of their rights in open court.
Timing is where states disagree. Must judicial oversight precede rescue? Or
can it come after? Two distinct approaches have emerged. Several states have
enacted measures generally demanding prior judicial authorization for rescues
and removals.22 Judicial approval, under these schemes, is only excused by
"exigent" or "necessary" circumstances. For example, New York law authorizes
warrantless removals when there is "reasonable cause to believe that the child is
in ... imminent danger" and "there is not time enough to apply for an order
.... "23 Arkansas law states that warrantless removals are permissible only when
the child is in "immediate danger," "removal is necessary to prevent serious
harm," and "there is not time to petition for and to obtain an order of the court
prior to taking the juvenile into custody. '24 Similarly, Illinois law authorizes
dispensing with prior judicial process when "there is not time to apply for a court
20 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that the State must prove
that the parent is unfit by clear and convincing evidence).
21 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ("[W]e have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended '[i]f a [s]tate were to attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family ... without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children's best interest."') (citations omitted).
22 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-56 (1995) (requiring prior judicial authorization except
when immediate removal is "necessary"); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-303, 821 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2003) (requiring same); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-45 (Lexis 2001) (requiring same); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-13 (1991) (requiring same); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6324 (2000 &
Supp. 2004) (requiring same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.19(d) (West 2003) (requiring same); see
also ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-821 (1999 & Supp. 2003) (authorizing warrantless removal where
"clearly necessary" to protect child from "imminent ... abuse"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-101g (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) (authorizing immediate removal where necessary to
prevent imminent harm); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(b) (2001 & Supp. 2004) (requiring prior
hearing unless warrantless removal "required" to protect child); IDAHO CODE § 16-1612
(Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003) (dispensing with warrant where "prompt removal is necessary");
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.390. 1(a) (Michie 2002) (authorizing warrantless removal where
"immediate action is necessary" to protect child).
23 N.Y. COURT ACTS LAW § 1024(a) (McKinney 1999). See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193
F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussed infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text).
24 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-313(a)(1)(c) (2002 & Supp. 2003).
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order." 25 Iowa's, 26 Missouri's, 27 Tennessee's, 28 and Virginia's statutes are all of
similar ilk.2 9
On the other side of this divide, a number of jurisdictions have dispensed
with warrants (and other forms of ex ante court orders) altogether in the child
abuse arena. Rather than condition initial removal on warrants or what commonly
constitute "exigent circumstances," only probable cause to believe the child has
been, or is being, abused is needed. "[S]tandard office procedure" in New York
City prior to 1999, for example, was to seek "removal of a child first and ... a
court order later.. ,,30 Utah law authorizes warrantless removals based on only
a "substantial risk ... of .. physical[] or sexual[] abuse[]. ' ' 31 Rhode Island
allows removal by law enforcement officers [w]hen the child's condition or
surroundings reasonably appear to be such as to jeopardize the child's welfare, 32
and by social workers when there exists "reasonable cause to believe that the
child or his or her sibling has been abused and/or neglected and that continued
care of the child by his or her parent or other person responsible for the child's
welfare will result in imminent further harm to the child."'33 In Kansas, children
25 See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5 (West 2001).
26 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.79 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (allowing warrantless
removal when "there is not enough time to apply for an order").
27 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.125.2 (West 2004) (warrantless removal authorized where
"imminent danger" and "reasonable cause to believe the harm or threat to life may occur before
a juvenile court could issue a temporary protective custody order or before a juvenile officer
could take the child into protective custody").
28 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-114(a)(2) (2001) (authorizing warrantless removal
"because the child is subject to an immediate threat to the child's health or safety to the extent
that delay for a hearing would be likely to result in severe or irreparable harm").
29 See Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 344 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing that
emergency removals in Virginia are allowed only when "a court order is not immediately
obtainable"). See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XXIV) (2002). This statute defines
protective custody to mean
the status of a child who has been taken into physical custody by a police officer or
juvenile probation and parole officer because the child was in such circumstances or
surroundings which presented an imminent danger to the child's health or life and where
there was not sufficient time to obtain a court order.
Id.; Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting California law to
not authorize warrantless removal in the absence of exigent circumstances).
30 See Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 591 (2d Cir. 1999).
31 UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-202. 1(1)(b) (2004). The failure to provide pre-deprivation
process in Utah was successfully challenged in Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir.
2003). For a discussion of Roska, see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
32 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-5(b) (2004).
33 Id. § 40-11-5(d). This same statute then provides that "the child shall not be detained in
protective custody longer than forty-eight (48) hours without the expressed approval of a justice
of the family court." Id.
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can be removed when officials have reasonable grounds to believe that
circumstances are "harmful to the child,"34 even when there is time to seek a
warrant.35 Oklahoma law authorizes removal "[b]y a peace officer or employee of
the court, without a court order if... continuation of the child in the child's home
is contrary to the health, safety or welfare of the child ... -"36 Oregon allows
warrantless removals "[w]hen the child's condition or surroundings reasonably
appear to be such as to jeopardize the child's welfare .... "37 Similarly, Montana
authorizes social workers and police officers who have "reason to believe any
youth is in immediate or apparent danger of harm" to "immediately remove the
youth and place the youth in a protective facility."'38
Two distinct approaches have thus emerged in the United States. The former
favors warrants, court orders, and judicial assistance. Only true, factually specific
emergencies justify unilateral executive action. The latter approach trusts police
officers and social workers to make proper rescue decisions, at least in the first
instance and for a limited amount of time. One might say that potential child
abuse constitutes a categorical emergency, and immediate rescue is always
justified by probable cause. Time and ability to seek warrants or court orders are
irrelevant under this regime. Exigent circumstances are not needed.39
34 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1527(b) (2000).
35 See Stremski v. Owens, 734 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Kan. 1987) (interpreting Kansas law to
authorize removal based solely on probable cause to believe child was abused).
36 OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-2.1 .A. 1 (West Supp. 2004).
37 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.150(l)(a) (Michie 2003).
38 MONT. CODE ANN. §41-3-301(1) (2003). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 620.040(5)(c) (Michie Supp. 2003) (authorizing warrantless removal when police have
probable cause to believe a child "is being sexually abused"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A. 14 (West 2002) (authorizing police to take custody of a child "whose surroundings are
such as to endanger his or her health, morals, or welfare" without a warrant). Laws in several
other states are ambiguous about when immediate, warrantless removal is proper. In Hawaii,
for example, police may remove children if they feel the parents have harmed the children and
are "likely to flee." HAw. REV. STAT. § 587-22 (Supp. 2003). Children can then be retained in
governmental custody, without a hearing, so long as they are threatened with "imminent harm."
Id. § 524 (1993). Some states, like Maryland and Mississippi, condition warrantless removals
on "immediate danger," without defining that term. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-709(d)
(1999) (allowing forcible entry and removal based on "belie[fJ that a child is in serious,
immediate danger"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-303 (1999) (child may be summarily removed
if there is probable cause to believe the "child is in immediate danger"); In re Guardianship of
L.S. & H.S., 87 P.3d 521, 526 n.22 (Nev. 2004) (Nevada law "does not provide judicial review
prior to the state initiating an investigation or taking the child into protective custody. A hearing
is provided only afterward.").
39 It is impossible to say which approach predominates in the United States. One
commentator has offered that "[m]ost warrantless entries and searches in the context of child
abuse investigations are conducted in accordance with the emergency doctrine [established in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)]." See Jillian Grossman, Note, The Fourth
Amendment: Relaxing the Rule in Child Abuse Investigations, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1303,
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Each of these approaches has pluses and minuses on a normative scale. Prior
judicial review, for example, checks executive license and eliminates errors.40
This enhanced accuracy, however, is not cost-free. Judicial time is expensive.4 1
The demands of the warrant process might dissuade government officials from
pursuing abuse complaints in close cases, 42 allowing abuse to continue.
Dispensing with the need for prior judicial review, meanwhile, saves time (and
money) and may facilitate detection, but risks unnecessary invasions of privacy
and familial harmony.43 Further, invasive governmental practices risk alienating
parents who need help and who would otherwise cooperate with social workers.
Putting money aside, the question comes down to this: what is the optimal way to
uncover child abuse while respecting familial privacy?
Two constitutional doctrines prove relevant to whether judicial participation
must precede, or may follow, a state's rescue of an allegedly abused child. First,
the Fourth Amendment bans unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme
Court has concluded-at least as a starting point-that the Fourth Amendment's
1332 (2002). In populous jurisdictions, like New York City and Florida, however, the opposite
appears true. Even in those states that require exigent circumstances, social workers tend to err
on the side of child safety, which often undermines any statutory warrant requirement that is in
place. This is what happened in Florida prior to the 1998-1999 statutory changes (which are
discussed infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text); social workers simply ignored the state's
statutory warrant requirement and claimed that every case involved an emergency. It is
plausible today that most rescues in the United States take place without either warrants or
exigent circumstances. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of
Emergency Removal in Child Protection Proceedings, 42 F.v, CT. REv. 540, 540-41 (2004)
(observing that "more than 700 children" are removed each day in the United States and that
they "are seldom removed on anything but an emergency basis--either unilaterally, without a
court order, or on the basis of some form of ex parte judicial authorization. The number of
emergency removals, moreover, ... now occur at nearly double the rate of 20 years ago.")
(citation omitted).
40 See William j. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 891, 893 (1991) (observing that warrants are "likely to help, at least marginally, prevent
bad police searches" and do "reduce the odds of police mistake in applying the relevant legal
standards").
41 Id. at 888 ("Warrants are, in short, costly.").
42 Id. at 891 ("[T]he police are surely less likely to search my house if they must wait
around a courthouse to get permission than if they may simply drive to my door and walk in.").
43 Id. at 893 (concluding that "pre-screening devices[] ... can virtually eliminate the risk
of mistake .... [a]nd surely it is better to prevent harm from happening than to clean up the
milk after it's been spilled"). Professor Stuntz ultimately concludes that the benefits supporting
the warrant requirement may be overstated. Post-search review, he concludes, provides a
realistic deterrent, and thus helps limit license and mistakes. Id. at 891 ("[I]t seems likely that
warrants do no more than catch the occasional case where a police officer wants to behave with
clear illegality but does not fear any after-the-fact sanction.").
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reasonableness requirement demands prior judicial approval.44 Because the
rescue of a child is generally understood to qualify as a seizure,4 5 the Fourth
Amendment offers an obvious constitutional stumbling block. Second, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause ordinarily requires process-
sometimes judicial in nature-before deprivations of life, liberty and property.46
Parents' interests in caring for and controlling their children have long been
recognized as "liberty" within the Fourteenth Amendment's terms. Due process,
at first blush, would thus appear to require some sort of process before children
can be taken from their homes.
Unfortunately, it is not that easy. Students of Criminal Procedure and
Constitutional Law have long been tortured by exceptions to constitutional rules.
The Fourth Amendment, in particular, is so peppered with exceptions that many
think it folly to speak about a "general" warrant requirement. 47 The same goes for
procedural due process, which quite often allows post-deprivation process and
only occasionally demands that prior process be cloaked in judicial garb.48
Foregoing ex parte pre-rescue judicial authorization in favor of contested post-
rescue process in child abuse cases certainly has constitutional support. Indeed, as
the circuit split described below demonstrates, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment precedents point in both directions.
A. Florida's Experience
Florida's child welfare system has been under fire for almost twenty years.
One commentator has observed that it is "seemingly out-of-control, inflexible,
and unfixable." 49 Another has concluded that Florida has "a remarkable history of
failure."'50 Since 1985, Florida's child welfare system has been studied by twelve
44 See generally LAFAvE E7 AL., supra note 18, at 157-60 (observing that the general
preference for search warrant is defined by its numerous exceptions).
45 See infra notes 286-92 and accompanying text.
46 See generally Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for
Parratt, Hudson and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REV. 813, 817-18 (1987) (describing Supreme Court
cases generating this proposition).
47 See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 882 (noting that "in practice warrants are the exception
rather than the rule").
48 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1277 (1975)
(discussing the "flexible" nature of procedural due process and how it sometimes allows non-
judicial process before deprivations).
49 Marsha B. Freeman, Privatization of Child Protective Services: Getting the Lion Back
in the Cage?, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 449,449 (2003).
50 Tony Bridges, Lost in Plain Sight: The Legacy of Foster Care-Kids Find the State
Fails Them, TALLAHAssEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 9, 2003, at Al.
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special committees and at least five grand juries.51 It is no exaggeration to say that
Florida's model is a constant work in progress.
Given its faults and shortcomings, Florida officials have regularly tinkered
with the system. Like most states, 52 Florida initially offered few procedural
protections to parents suspected of child abuse. Parcel to the procedural
revolutions of the 1960s53 and 1970s, 54 however, Florida (like many states)
reformed its child welfare system in 1978 to require pre-rescue judicial
authorization. Judicial participation was only excused by "immediate danger," a
close cousin of "exigent circumstances. '55
Florida followed this model for twenty turbulent years. By 1998, however, it
became clear that changes were needed. Florida's system too often failed to
protect abused children. One case, in particular, grabbed the public's attention.
Kayla McKean, a six-year-old girl, was beaten to death by her abusive father.56
Critics blamed Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)
for her death. HRS, after all, had received several abuse reports, but did not act
quickly enough to save her.57 In order to fulfill a campaign pledge to "fix the
system," newly-elected Governor Jeb Bush orchestrated a massive overhaul of
Florida's protective services system.58
51 Id.
52 See infra notes 179-243 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (holding that juvenile delinquents are
entitled to many of the procedural protections due adults). See infra notes 244-48 and
accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 46, at 822-23 (describing procedural revolution of 1970s
in context of Due Process).
55 Florida enacted a version of the UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT AcT (1968) [hereinafter
MODEL Acr], which is discussed infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text. See 1978 Fla.
Laws ch. 78-414, § 20. As enacted in 1978, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.401(1) (West 1978) required
either a court order, id. § (a), or "reasonable grounds to believe that the child has been
abandoned, abused, or neglected, is suffering from illness or injury, or is in immediate danger
from his surroundings and that his removal is necessary to protect the child." Id. § (b). See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.401 (West 1987) (quoting 1978 version of statute). Florida's Rules of Juvenile
Procedure at this time reflected § 39.401(1)'s preference for court orders. Rule 8.030 authorized
courts to issue detention orders "directing that [children] be taken into custody" based on
verified petitions, affidavits or sworn testimony. See Petition of the Florida Bar to Amend the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 462 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1984) (reporting amended Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure); see also In re Petition of the Florida Bar to Amend the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 589 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1991) (reporting the same rule renumbered as
8.005 in 1991).
56 See Michael Fechter, Helping Till it Hurts? DCF Errs By Taking Children in Marginal
Cases, Lawyers Say, TAMPA TRIB., May 29, 2002, at 1 (describing Kayla McKean's murder).
57 Id. ("State officials were blamed for failing to act on numerous complaints and
suspicions that the child was being abused.").
58 See RUTH STONE EZELL, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.18 (1999). The
author makes the following observations regarding Florida's system in 1998:
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Florida's changes included more expansive reporting requirements, 59 greater
penalties for those who did not report child abuse, 60 and increased investigatory
requirements. 61 Because of the publicity generated by cases like Kayla
McKean's, HRS's name was even changed to "Department of Children and
Families" (DCF). Last but not least, Florida abandoned its pre-deprivation process
model. Florida's alternative requirements of prior judicial authorization 62 or
exigent circumstances 63 were deleted in favor of a simple probable cause
standard. Judicial oversight under Florida's revamped approach would come only
after rescue.64
The year 1998 was also a year of child deaths and disappearances. Some of these
children previously had been reported as victims of abuse or neglect to the Department
.... In response, changes were enacted to dependency statutes to impose mandatory
obligations on the department when there are previous reports of abuse and neglect.
Id.
59 See FLA. STAT. ANN., § 39.201(1)(g) (West 2002).
60 Id. § 39.205.
61 Id. § 39.301.
62 See 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 98-403, § 57.
63 See 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-193, § 22. Florida law was thus changed from alternatively
requiring court orders or emergency circumstances to demanding only probable cause:
(1) A child may only be taken into custody:
(a) Pursuant to the provisions of this part, based upon swom testimony, either before
or after a petition is filed; or
(b) By a law enforcement officer, or an authorized agent of the department, if the
officer or authorized agent has probable cause to support a finding:
1. That the child has been abused; neglected; or abandoned, or is suffering from or is
in imminent danger of illness or injury as a result of abuse, neglect, or abandonment;
2. That the parent or legal custodian of the child has materially violated a condition of
placement imposed by the court; or
3. That the child has no parent, legal custodian, or responsible adult relative
immediately known and available to provide supervision and care.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §39.401 (West 2003).
64 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.402(8)(a) (West 2003) ("A child may not be held in a shelter
longer than 24 hours unless an order so directing is entered by the court after a shelter
hearing.").
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Florida's statutory changes brought immediate results. DCF offices were
inundated with child abuse reports. Calls to Florida's toll-free child abuse
hotline,65 and the investigations that followed, 66 rose by almost half. The number
of rescues, dependency petitions,67 and shelters, 68 meanwhile, almost doubled.
Notwithstanding significant budget increases, 69 even larger caseworker turnover
rates70 prevented Florida's investigative system from keeping up.7 1 Caseworkers'
average loads, which tripled, greatly exceeded DCF's expected levels.72
As caseworker loads increased, newspapers in Florida reported more and
more lapses by DCF. 73 Not only was parental abuse often overlooked,74 but
65 See Karla Jackson, Abuse Reports Rise, Strains Frantic DCF, TAMPA TRIB., June 15,
2002, at 1 ("Calls to the hot line shot up 43 percent after the 1998 death of Kayla McKean... "). This
phenomenon does not appear to be confined to Florida. Rather, it appears to be national in
scope. See Harold A. Richman, From a Radiologist's Judgment to Public Policy on Child
Abuse and Neglect: What Have We Wrought?, 30 PEDIATRIC RADIOLOGY, 219, 223 (2000).
66 See Fechter, supra note 56 (reporting that "[i]nvestigations have jumped 45 percent
since a change in state law made it a crime not to report suspected child abuse").
67 See In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 780 So. 2d 906, 909 (Fla. 2001)
(observing that statutory revisions increased dependency filings by eighty-four percent between
July 1997 and December 1999).
6 8 See David Cox, Florida Has Plenty of Similar Laws: From Child-Protection to
Growth-Management: Unintended Consequences Mar Many of the Sunshine State's Policies,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 2, 2000, at G1 (observing that the number of children "placed into
protective homes shot up 74 percent, placing bigger burdens in an already overburdened foster-
care system").
69 See Karla Jackson, Down But Not Out: Neglect Allegations Arise Because of a Family's
Poverty, TAVPA TRIB., July 7, 2002, at 1 (observing that "[l]awmakers have poured money into
the DCF since the 1998 death of Kayla McKean" and that "[fJunding for the department has
more than doubled since then, from $167 million in 1998-99 to $339 million for 2002-03").
70 See Fechter, supra note 56 (quoting Jack Levine, president of Center for Florida's
Children, as stating Florida has a "42 percent turnover rate each year"); More Funding for
Neglected Children, TAMPA TRm., Jan. 29, 2003, at 10 (observing that Governor Bush sought
to hire 400 new caseworkers and increase their salaries "in an effort to keep them on board").
71 See Kathleen Chapman, Thousands Could Lose DCF Jobs in Revamp, PALM BEACH
POST, Feb. 7, 2003, at 10A (quoting DCF head, Jerry Regier, as stating that his "overburdened
agency ... has too few workers trying to care for too many children"). In an effort to cure its
personnel problem, DCF in 2003 began attempting to transfer its investigative duties to local
sheriffs' offices. Id.
72 See Jackson, supra note 65 (reporting that Mike Watkins, family safety director for
DCF, stated that investigators were handling forty-four cases at a time, when the "ideal" load
ought to be twelve).
73 See Bridges, supra note 50 ("Newspaper headlines read like a litany of disasters:
missing kids, drunken caseworkers, lost records and a $230 million computer system that didn't
work correctly.").
74 See Carol Marbin Miller, Regier: DCF Needs to Shrink, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 2003,
at 1 B (noting that "more children who were already the subject of at least one abuse or neglect
report died in 2001 than ever before"); Keeping Families Intact, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Feb.
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foster care abuse emerged as a notorious problem.75 Further, newspapers began
reporting innocent parents who had become mired in Florida's welfare system.76
Not only were children being needlessly rescued from their homes,77 but parents
were finding it extremely difficult to prove their innocence and retrieve their
children. Children in Florida were thus spending more time than ever in foster
care.
78
It is impossible to identify a single cause of Florida's foster care
phenomenon. It may be that more children in Florida truly needed protection.
Florida's enhanced reporting and investigating requirements resulted in more
frequent discoveries of abused children, and consequently the placement of more
children in foster homes. Another factor that should be considered is whether
Florida's "rescue first" policy has helped inflate Florida's foster care population.
Are judges less willing to return rescued children to their parents than they are to
deny rescue warrants beforehand? If so, it may be that the shift from pre- to post-
deprivation process has fueled foster care's inflation.
Florida's experience with post-deprivation process suggests that this may in
fact be the case. During one fifteen-month period in 1999-2000, for example,
2857 children were summarily rescued by Florida officials. 79 Only eighty-six of
these children, approximately three percent, were returned to their parents within
twenty-four hours.80 Because some of these returns resulted from unilateral
agency decisions,81 DCF's success rate under Florida's post-deprivation review
15, 2003, at 14A ("In some districts, headlines suggest... [m]any kids have been left in unsafe
situations because department caseworkers have lacked the time, training or shelter beds to
place them elsewhere.").
75 See, e.g., Susan Jacobson, Sex Abuse Suspect Walks into a Trap, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
July 17, 2003, at B 1 (describing allegations of sex abuse in foster care); Tonyaa Weathersbee,
No Easy Answers in Sight for State Children's Agency, FL. TIMES-UNIoN, June 2, 2003, at B7
(describing children's deaths at hands of foster parents).
76 See Miller, supra note 74 (observing that "an unprecedented number of children were
taken from their parents"); Keeping Families Intact, supra note 74 ("Critics often accused
[DCF] ... of removing too many children from their homes.").
77 See, e.g., Fechter, supra note 56 (describing story of mother whose two children were
removed because one accidentally suffered a broken arm). One Florida lawyer commented, "If
there is any inkling of any kind of problem in the home, they yank the kid out." Id. (quoting
lawyer Norman Palumbo).
78 See Dolce, supra note 16, at 551-52 (observing that Florida's average stay in foster care
is almost three years). See also Chill, supra note 39, at 541 (observing that the foster care
population in America suffered "inexorable growth ... fueled by emergency removals, [and]
has led to a consensus that the child welfare system is in crisis.").
79 Tis period began on July 1, 1999 and ended on September 30, 2000. See Doe v.
Kearney, No. 8:00-cv-184-T-26B (M.D. Fla. 2000) (deposition of Beth Pasek at 12-13) (on file
with author).
8°Id. at 13.
81 Id.
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model thus closely approached ninety-eight percent. 82 Remarkable as it may
sound, Florida's judges found that DCF correctly estimated probable cause in
ninety-eight out of every one hundred cases.
Of course, these figures admit several possible explanations. It may be that
Florida's caseworkers are remarkably good at what they do. Alternatively,
Florida's population of abused children might be so large that even shoddy
investigations uncover real problems. More likely, Florida's judges simply proved
unwilling to return rescued children to their parents. DCF was uniformly given
every benefit of the doubt, even when probable cause was plainly lacking. Rather
than prove that DCF is quite prescient, Florida's ninety-eight percent success rate
is more plausibly explained by its judges simply acting as "rubber stamps."
Proving that Florida's judges are unduly deferential or that DCF is uncannily
good is impossible. However, Florida's anecdotal evidence of disarray83 and
commonly accepted success rates for warrantless and warrant-based searches
impeach any inference that DCF is practically perfect. Conventional wisdom
recognizes that warrantless searches are more error-prone than those supported by
warrants. Professor Stuntz explains this phenomenon as a function of the time and
effort needed to obtain warrants:
Warrants raise the costs of searching. To get them, police must draft affidavits
and wait around courthouses. Partly for this reason, warrants also raise the
substantive standard applied to the search. If an officer knows he must spend
82 "Shelter" hearings must be held in Florida within twenty-four hours of rescue. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.402(8)(a) (West 2003).
A child may not be held in a shelter longer than 24 hours unless an order so directing
is entered by the court after a shelter hearing. In the interval until the shelter hearing is
held, the decision to place the child in a shelter or release the child from a shelter lies with
the protective investigator.
Id.
These hearings are designed to assess the factual basis supporting the rescue-that is, whether
probable cause exists. Should a judge conclude that probable cause does not exist, the child is
not sheltered and is returned to his parents. Even in the few cases where this occurred, Florida
officials adamantly denied making mistakes. When asked whether mistakes had been made in
the small number of cases that resulted in findings of no probable cause, Beth Pasek, a Family
Services Specialist, stated: "I don't think they're errors when it's-when you're looking at
probable cause and you're following the procedures that are set for you when you're making
the decision is this child at risk. So you're not making any error when you choose to protect a
child." Deposition of Beth Pasek, supra note 79, at 13.
83 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. See also Chill, supra note 39, at 543-44
(concluding that judges are unwilling to overturn rescues because of an unwillingness to place
children in a potentially abusive environment).
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several hours on the warrant, he is likely not to ask for it unless he is pretty sure
he will find the evidence. 84
The best estimates for warrant-based searches peg success rates--defined as
locating at least part of the evidence being sought-somewhere between seventy
and ninety percent.85 Given the "strikingly impressive" 86 nature of these success
rates, I suspect that serious students of police practices would be surprised to find
a police department with a warrantless success rate exceeding eighty percent.
This would be particularly true of a police department whose officers were
grossly overworked, woefully undertrained, and constantly looking for other
employment. Arguing that caseworkers in Florida, under these very same
conditions, are correct about probable cause ninety-eight percent of the time
defies logic. Indeed, the local judge in Florida who ordered the return of the Does'
children (discussed below) complained that she was supplied "incorrect
information all the time" by DCF agents.87
DCF, moreover, has all but admitted that the Kayla McKean tragedy caused
it to rescue more children than necessary. In early 2003, DCF's new leadership
pledged additional reforms designed to reduce caseworkers' workloads and
increase their salaries. 88 DCF also promised a greater emphasis on preserving
84 William J. Stuntz, OJ. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 848 (2001).
85 Id. ("[P]olice find at least some of what they're looking for in more than eighty percent
of warrant-based searches, and find most of what they're looking for in ... over seventy
percent of such searches."). See also Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 925
(1986) (observing that for warrant searches, "the proportion of searches that discovered at least
some of the evidence named in the warrant ranged from 74 to 89%").
86 Dripps, supra note 85, at 925.
87 See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. I recognize that my comparison---
between social workers believing they have probable cause and police uncovering evidence-is
not perfect. In particular, there need be no direct correlation between "success" and "probable
cause." A police officer may be correct about the existence of probable cause, for example, and
yet less-than-successful at uncovering evidence. A success rate of eighty percent, thus, does not
necessarily imply that police officers' estimations of probable cause are correct only eighty
percent of the time. While I am aware of no data establishing how often police properly
estimate probable cause, I seriously doubt that police officers are correct ninety-eight percent of
the time. Their success rates, while impressive, prove they make mistakes. And these mistakes
likely infect estimations of probable cause, too. Similarly, given national studies suggesting that
one-third of all rescued children have suffered no abuse, see Chill, supra note 39, at 541, it
seems reasonably clear that social workers make mistakes. I thus cannot believe they correctly
estimate probable cause ninety-eight percent-or even ninety percent-of the time.
88 See Miller, supra note 74 (observing that DCF planned on hiring 1000 new employees,
increasing salaries, and reducing workloads to the national average).
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families, 89 which translates into fewer rescues. 90 In fact, DCF has now pledged to
reduce the number of children placed in the state's care by twenty-five percent.91
This does not mean that pre-rescue review would necessarily prove less
deferential to DCF. Like it or not, judges may simply err on the side of rescue,
whether consulted before or after the fact. Still, having taught Criminal Procedure
for a number of years, I (like others in the field) continue to believe that judges
"apply a higher standard when judging warrant applications before the search
than when deciding suppression motions after the incriminating evidence has
been found." 92 Experience teaches that judges are less deferential toward
executive officers when asked to authorize their conduct beforehand.
B. Doe v. Keamey
Doe v. Kearney9 3 arose during the heyday of Florida's "rescue first" policy.
On January 18, 2000, John Doe's nine-year-old niece (T.O.) stated to some
unknown person that her uncle (John Doe) had molested her four years earlier.94
89 Miller, supra note 74.
90 See Chapman, supra note 71, at 1 OA (quoting Jerry Regier as stating that "I think
clearly what we saw in the previous administration was more of the emphasis on removal, and
we believe, without lowering any standards of safety, that we can certainly serve some children
in their homes").
91 See Miller, supra note 74 (observing that DCF "will seek to reduce the number of
children in state care by 25 percent before the summer of 2004").
92 Stuntz, supra note 84, at 848. See also Chill, supra note 39, at 547 (arguing that the
pressures on judges to approve rescues "increase dramatically once the child is already in
placement" and "[r]equiring judicial preauthorization of emergency removals whenever
possible... may prevent at least some unnecessary removals").
93 Doe v. Keamey, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Regier,
124 S. Ct. 389 (2003).
94 Unless otherwise indicated, these facts are drawn from pleadings and reasonable
inferences contained in the Does' Complaint (on file with author) and Defendants' Answer (on
file with author). See Does' "Memorandum Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment"
(hereinafter "Does' Motion for Summary Judgment") (on file with author). Because the District
Court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendants, the factual recitation in this
Article draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the Does. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals in Doe did not abide by
this standard in reciting facts and drawing conclusions. For instance, its opinion suggests that
O'Brien did not decide to remove N.O. and B.O. until after interviewing them on Friday
evening. Doe, 329 F.3d at 1290-91. It also concluded that "the record demonstrates that [the
Does] gave [O'Brien] consent to enter," id. at 1299 n. 15, and that O'Brien had probable cause
to remove the Does' children. Reasonable factfinders, like the state court that returned the
Does' children, could just as easily have concluded that O'Brien lacked probable cause, decided
to remove the children earlier in the day, and was not given legal permission to enter the Does'
home. The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that O'Brien's conduct was "nearly unassailable," id.
at 1299, is thus factually questionable under any constitutional standard.
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This charge was relayed to Florida's DCF9 5 that same day.96 Three days later, on
January 21, 2000, at approximately 12:30 PM, the charge and accompanying
intake report were forwarded to Deborah O'Brien, a social worker in DCF's
Hillsborough County Office.97 The report delivered to O'Brien was marked,
"Response Priority: 24 hours," meaning that the risk of harm to the Does'
children was "low to intermediate." 98 The report was not marked "Immediate
Response" or "Response Priority: 3 hours," DCF's two higher priority levels,
which would have indicated a need for immediate action.99
Based on T.O.'s allegation and John Doe's criminal record-which O'Brien
mistakenly interpreted to include prior child abuse charges--O'Brien decided that
the Does' three minor children, D.M. (age 13), B.O. (age 6), and N.O. (age 9),
needed to be immediately rescued from their parents. O'Brien reached this
conclusion at approximately 2:10 PM on January 21, 2000. Pursuant to Florida
law, O'Brien contacted supervisors in her office for approval.100
Upon receiving approval, O'Brien at approximately 2:45 PM drove to D.M.'s
school and had school officials remove her from class.' 0 ' D.M. was questioned
about her parents and then formally taken into custody at about 4:10 PM. 102 In an
effort to coordinate the rescue of the remaining Doe children with local deputies,
O'Brien waited for approximately two hours before driving to the Does' home, a
short distance away. 10 3 Because D.M. did not arrive home from school on time,
the unsuspecting Does immediately began searching for her. John Doe drove to
her school while Jane Doe canvassed the neighborhood.' 0 4 Between 5:20 PM and
6:00 PM, after unsuccessfully waiting for a deputy sheriff, O'Brien arrived at the
Does' home10 5 and announced to Jane Doe that "she had to allow me access to
the children."' 1 6 Jane Doe opened the door to her home and allowed O'Brien to
95 Petitioners sued the DCF Secretary, Kathleen Kearney, and Don Dixon, head of the
Hillsborough County office of DCF, in their official capacities under Exparte Young, 209 U.S.
123 (1908), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does prospective claims against
Keamey (who was later replaced by Regier) and Dixon were thus claims against DCF. See
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991) (observing that claims against officials for prospective
relief are in reality claims against their institutional employer).
96 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4.
97 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4.
98 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4.
99 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4.
100 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4.
101 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 5.
102 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 4
103 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 5.
104 See Doe v. Keamey, No. 8:00-cv-184-T-26B (transcript of hearing, held on June 18,
2001, at 197-201) (on file with author).
105 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 5.
106 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 5.
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question the Does' two younger children, B.O. and N.O. 0 7 O'Brien then seized
the two children.
Pursuant to Florida law, a contested "shelter" hearing was held the following
morning in Florida's Hillsborough County Circuit Court, a court of general
jurisdiction.'1 8 The Does were present with their attorney. Based on T.O.'s
allegation (which was described in O'Brien's affidavit), John Doe's "extensive
arrest record,"'109 and his "history of molesting children,""l 0 DCF argued that
probable cause existed to remove the Does' three children. When pressed by the
court-which complained, "that's what people tell me for the past two years,
extensive arrest record, and then when I see the arrest record, I see a DUI from
1978 or something like that,"I'i and "I get incorrect information all the
time"' '12-DCF's counsel admitted that there was no evidence that John Doe had
any prior child-abuse conviction. 1 3 The court thus concluded that DCF lacked
"probable cause to shelter these children at this time""l 4 and ordered their
immediate return.
The Does sued DCF and O'Brien under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In addition to money damages from O'Brien, they sought
prospective relief declaring Florida's rescue law unconstitutional and enjoining its
enforcement' 115 In a pretrial order,1 6 the district court upheld Florida's summary
removal procedure as "satisfying] the emergency circumstances exception to pre-
deprivation process ..... '17 Although the "mere possibility of danger is not
107 Does' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 94, at 5-6.
108 Florida law requires that shelter hearings be had within twenty-four hours of rescue.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 39.402(8)(a).
109 See In the Interest of B.O., N.O., D.O. [sic], No. 501797 A, B, C (Jan. 22, 2000), at 4.
A copy of the transcript of this hearing is attached as an Appendix to the Does' Petition for Writ
of Certiorari filed with the Supreme Court of the United States. See Doe v. Regier, No. 03-174
(petition filed Aug. 1, 2003) (App. at 43).
110 Doe v. Regier, No. 03-174 (petition filed Aug. 1, 2003) (App. at 40).
III Id. at43.
112 Id. at 44.
13 Id.
114 Id. at43.
115 Both the district court and court of appeals concluded that the Does had Article III
standing to pursue their claims for prospective relief See Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d at 1292-93.
Because the Does' claim against O'Brien for damages raised the identical constitutional issues
raised in their claim for prospective relief, the standing doctrine was no real impediment to the
courts reaching the constitutional issues raised in the case. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 478 n. 1 (1989) (noting that claim for money damages establishes standing).
116 See Doe v. Keamey, No. 8:00-cv-184-T-26B (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2001). A copy of the
district court's order is attached to the Does' Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court of the United States. See Doe v. Regier, No. 03-174 (petition filed Aug. 1,
2003) (App. at 25).
117 Id. at 32.
[Vol. 65: 913
PRE-DEPRIVATIONPROCESS
enough," 118 the court stated, "evidence of serious ongoing abuse" is. 119
"Furthermore, [Florida law] provides that a hearing must occur within 24 hours
after removal of a child, thereby affording parents post deprivation process. [The
Does] failed to provide the Court with any binding cases where similar statutory
provisions were deemed constitutionally insufficient."' 120 The only genuine issue,
it concluded, was whether O'Brien had probable cause-which constitutes an
automatic emergency under Florida law-to remove the Does' children. 121 If she
did, rescue was proper under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Trial commenced on June 18, 2001. Following the Does' case-in-chief, the
district court awarded O'Brien judgment as a matter of law based on qualified
immunity. 122 Notwithstanding the state court's finding that O'Brien lacked
probable cause, 123 the district court concluded as a matter of law that O'Brien had
"arguable probable cause" to seize the Doe children. 124 In its final order, the
district court stated that "O'Brien ... was justified in believing that probable
cause and emergency circumstances existed to justify removal of the Doe children
from their parents without prior judicial approval as authorized by [Florida
law]."125
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 12 6 The Does' argument, the Eleventh Circuit
complained, would require:
that a state official obtain a court order prior to removing a suspected victim of
child abuse from parental custody, unless: (1) the official has probable cause to
believe the child is in imminent danger of abuse; and (2) the official reasonably
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 32-33.
121 Id. at 34-35.
122 See Doe v. Keamey, No. 8:00-cv-184-T-26B (transcript of hearing, held on June 19,
2001, at 49) (on file with author).
123 See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
124 Transcript of hearing, supra note 122, at 49 ("[a] reasonable case worker in the
position of Ms. O'Brien was justified in concluding that these children should have been
taken").
125 See Doe v. Kearney, No. 8:00-cv-184-T-26B (M.D. Fla. June 26, 2002). A copy of the
district court's order is attached to the Does' Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court of the United States. See Doe v. Regier, No. 03-174 (petition filed Aug. 1,
2003) (App. at 36). The Does immediately appealed the district court's judgment in favor of
O'Brien and what appeared to be a final judgment in favor of DCF. Because the district court's
judgment did not mention DCF, however, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as
premature on April 8, 2002, and remanded the matter back to the district court. On June 26,
2002, the district court reiterated its prior conclusions in favor of DCF and O'Brien and
formally re-entered judgment in favor of all the defendants. The Does' subsequent,
unsuccessful appeal is reported as Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
126 Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11 th Cir. 2003).
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determines that there is insufficient time to obtain judicial permission before
temporarily removing the child. 12 7
The court was "not persuaded that due process demands such an inflexible
rule.' 128 The constitutional inquiry, it concluded, should not be "blunt[ed] ... by
simply asking whether there was time to get a warrant." 129 Traditional exigent
circumstances are not always needed to avoid the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments' warrant requirements. Florida's rescue law, as applied by O'Brien,
was thus sustained. Going one step farther than even the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that O'Brien had actual probable cause to rescue the
children.130 Because no constitutional violation occurred, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's award of qualified immunity.13'
C. Circuit Split
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that O'Brien was justified in summarily
removing the Does' children---even though she had ample time to seek a court
order-finds support in at least one other circuit court opinion. Like the Eleventh
Circuit, the First Circuit concluded in Tower v. Leslie-Brown that the risk of harm
to children by itself justifies dispensing with pre-rescue process. 132 Traditional
exigent circumstances are not required. In Tower, a Maine social worker and a
state trooper summarily removed children from their mother's custody following
the arrest of their stepfather. 133 A warrant was not obtained until several hours
later. 134 The mother (Tower) sued under § 1983 and complained that "no notice
or hearing was given before the children were removed."' 135 The First Circuit
disposed of this claim by holding that although generally "a deprivation of a
fundamental right such as the custody of one's children must be preceded by
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter," 136 where the safety of the
child is at risk, an "adequate post-deprivation hearing within a reasonable time" is
sufficient. 137 Like the Eleventh Circuit in Doe, the First Circuit concluded that
127 Id. at 1295 (emphasis in original).
12 8 Id.
129 Id. at 1298.
1301Id.
131 Id. at 1299.
132 Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 298 (1st Cir. 2003).
133 Id. at 298.
134 Id. at 299.
135 Id. (citing Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office of Suffolk, 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir.
2002)).
136 Id. at 298.
137 Id.
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"state actors may take emergency measures and place a child in temporary
custody before obtaining a court order when they have evidence that a child has
been abused or is in imminent danger."' 138 Because an ex parte court order was
obtained shortly after the removal, and a hearing was held five days later, the First
Circuit found that procedural due process was satisfied.
Because Tower was handed down just days before Doe, the Eleventh Circuit
did not cite it for support. It recognized, however, that its conclusion contradicted
precedent from at least one other circuit. 139 The Second Circuit decided three
years earlier in Tenenbaum v. Williams that prior judicial approval is ordinarily
required in order to remove children from their parents' custody and care. 14 0
Believing that a child (Sarah) might have been abused, New York social workers
in Tenenbaum seized Sarah at her school without her parents' knowledge or
permission. 141 The evidence of possible abuse came to the attention of the social
workers on a Friday.' 42 By the following Monday, they decided to take Sarah into
custody. 143 Sarah was not rescued, however, until noon on Tuesday. 144
Notwithstanding this delay, the social workers argued that the warrantless seizure
was justified because there was reason to believe that Sarah had been abused and
might be abused again. 145 Abuse, they urged, constitutes a categorical emergency
that always justifies dispensing with warrants. 146 The Second Circuit disagreed.
Over a lengthy dissent, it ruled that in the absence of reasonable cause to believe
that a prior court order could not be obtained in a timely fashion, the removal of a
child from its parents' custody and care violates procedural due process.' 47
Because "a properly instructed jury could conclude that at the time the
caseworkers decided to remove Sarah, there was reasonably sufficient time,
entirely consistent with Sarah's safety, to seek a court order ... [,] there was no
emergency."' 148 It explained:
If the danger to the child is not so imminent that there is reasonably sufficient
time to seek prior judicial authorization, ex parte or otherwise, for the child's
removal, then the circumstances are not emergent; there is no reason to excuse
the absence of the judiciary's participation in depriving the parents of the care,
138 Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 326 F.3d 290, 299 (1st Cir. 2003).
139 See Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11 th Cir. 2003).
140 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 594 (2d Cir. 1999).
141 Id. at 587.
142 Id. at 588.
143 Id. at 590.
144 Id.
14 5 Id. at 604.
14 6 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 591 (2d Cir. 1999).
147 Id. at 594-95.
148 Id. at 595.
2004]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
custody and management of their child. If, irrespective of whether there is time
to obtain a court order, all interventions are effected on an "emergency" basis
without judicial process, pre-seizure procedural due process for the parents and
their child evaporates. 149
While the Eleventh Circuit noted its obvious disagreement with the Second
Circuit, it attempted to distinguish holdings from other circuits that also appeared
to generally demand prior judicial process. The Eleventh Circuit opined that
"none of the[se] cases ... supports the proposition that a child welfare worker
must specifically determine whether there is time to obtain a court order before
conducting an emergency removal."'' 50
To the extent the Eleventh Circuit was referring to holdings of the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits, this conclusion seems solid. Decisions from these circuits
ambiguously have held that emergency circumstances are needed to dispense
with warrants, but never clearly stated that time is a central factor. 151 Contrary to
the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion, however, holdings of the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in Mabe v. San Bernardino County Department of Public Social
Services 152 and Roska v. Peterson153 clearly support the Second Circuit. Both
require warrants when temporally possible. Like the Second Circuit, both demand
traditional exigent circumstances to justify dispensing with warrants.
In Mabe, social workers in California who removed a child (M.D.) from its
home without a warrant were sued by M.D.'s parents for violating the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the social workers' motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding that the plaintiff stated violations that were clearly established:
"[g]ovemment officials are required to obtain prior judicial authorization ...
unless they possess information at the time of the seizure that establishes
'reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger .... 11,154 The
Ninth Circuit relied on two prior decisions, White v. Pierce County15 5 and
149 Id. at 594-95 (citation omitted).
150 Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
151 See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000); Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs. for Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935 (6th
Cir. 1985). Cf Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that parents
suffered no injury even if child was improperly removed without warrant because child would
have been removed anyway).
152 Mabe v. San Bemandino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th
Cir. 2001).
153 Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir. 2003).
154 Mabe, 237 F.3d atl 106 (quoting Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.
2000)).
155 White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1986).
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Calabretta v. Floyd,156 to define "imminent danger."'157 In White, where the
Ninth Circuit found no violation, a police officer who removed a child without
seeking a warrant reasonably believed the child would be injured "if he delayed to
get a warrant ... .,"158 In Calabretta, meanwhile, where a potential violation was
found, a police officer and social worker who conducted a warrantless removal
"did not perceive any danger of injury to the children or loss of evidence if they
secured a warrant."'159 Finding that the facts in Mabe "appear to fall somewhere
in between Calabretta and White,"'160 the Ninth Circuit remanded Mabe to the
trial court to address whether "the child would be harmed in any time it would
take to obtain a warrant."'161
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Wallis v. Spencer reached what appears to be
the same conclusion. 16 2 There, police removed two children, aged two and five,
from their parents based on an abuse allegation made by a relative.163 They had
no warrant; rather, the police claimed to have probable cause to believe the
children would be abused in the future. 164 The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants, finding that "the Police Department had reasonable
cause to remove the children from their parents' custody with or without a court
order .... "165
The Ninth Circuit reversed.166 It found triable issues of fact regarding both
the reasonableness of the officers' actions and the need for immediate removal:
156 Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 813 nn.9 & 12 (9th Cir. 1999).
157 Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1107.
158 Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 814 (describing White, 797 F.2d 812).
15 9 Id.
160 Mabe v. San Bemandino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th
Cir. 2001).
161 Id. (citation omitted). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no "concern that the child would be concealed or further
abused during the time it would take to get a warrant ..." Id. at 1108 (emphasis added). Even
though probable cause may have existed to support removal, moreover, "a showing of probable
cause does not satisfy the conclusion that M.D. was in imminent danger .... Id. at 1108 n.2
(citation omitted). See also Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978), to describe "imminent danger" in context of
child abuse investigation).
162 Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
163 Id. at 1131.
164 d. at 1143.
165 Id. at 1136.
166 Id. at 1145.
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Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parent without prior
judicial authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the
seizure is such as provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in
imminent danger of serious bodily injury and that the scope of the intrusion is
reasonably necessary to avert that specific injury. 167
Not only must police reasonably investigate before removing children, 168 the
"scope and degree of the state interference [must be] justified by the alleged
exigency."' 169 A jury could find that police lacked probable cause, did not
properly investigate the allegation, or overreacted by removing the children
without judicial assistance. 170
Similarly, in Roska v. Peterson, social workers removed a child from its
home without "even attempt[ing] to obtain an ex parte order."' 7 1 Reversing the
District Court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants (based on
qualified immunity), the Tenth Circuit concluded that "exceptional," "exigent"
circumstances are always needed to excuse the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments' warrant requirements. 172 Finding this rule clearly established since
1999,173 the court remanded the case to the trial court to address whether
circumstances of this nature existed. 17 4
The Roska court's description and application of the exigent circumstances
exception reveal that it was most certainly relying on traditional Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment standards. Circumstances suffice, according to the Tenth
Circuit, only when they render delay dangerous and make it impracticable to seek
167 Id. at 1138.
168 Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
169 Id. at 1140.
170 The Ninth Circuit explained:
Because the swing of every pendulum brings with it potential adverse consequences,
it is important to emphasize that in the area of child abuse, as with the investigation and
prosecution of all crimes, the state is constrained by the substantive and procedural
guarantees of the Constitution. The fact that the suspected crime may be heinous-
whether it involves children or adults-does not provide cause for the state to ignore the
rights of the accused or any other parties. Otherwise, serious injustices may result. In cases
of alleged child abuse, governmental failure to abide by constitutional constraints may
have deleterious long-term consequences for the child and, indeed, for the entire family.
Ill-considered and improper governmental action may create significant injury where no
problem of any kind previously existed.
Id. at 1130-31.
171 Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir. 2003).
172 Id. at 1240.
173 Id. at 1250.
174 Id. at 1254.
[Vol. 65: 913
PRE-DEPRIVA TION PROCESS
a warrant. "Although defendants at times assert that a delay to obtain a warrant
might have cost [the child] his life, the evidence shows otherwise."'175
[U]nless the child is in imminent danger, there is no reason that it is
impracticable to obtain a warrant before social workers remove a child from the
home. Defendants took the time to seek the advice of an Assistant Utah Attorney
General before proceeding with the removal; surely they could have taken the
time to incur the minimal inconvenience involved in obtaining a warrant.176
Citing the definition of "exceptional circumstances" provided by the Supreme
Court's decision in Mincey v. Arizona,177 the Tenth Circuit flatly rejected a
"special needs" exception that would have excused warrants in child abuse
cases.
178
With Doe and Tower on one side, and Tenenbaum, Mabe, and Roska on the
other, a clear split has emerged over the constitutional propriety of rescuing
children without either prior judicial process or exigent circumstances. The Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, as these decisions demonstrate, admit no easy
answers. In fact, the Court's constitutional rules and exceptions are so muddled
175 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
176 Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). At least one court has concluded that Roska demanded
traditional exigent circumstances in the context of child rescues. See Walsh v. Erie County
Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (citing Roska for the
proposition that "warrantless no-knock entry violated Fourth Amendment absent exigency of
imminent danger to child's welfare").
177 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Mincey rejected categorical exceptions
dispensing with the need for exigent circumstances-such as one based on the seriousness of
the criminal offense-in the criminal context: "there were no exigent circumstances in this case
.... There was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the
time required to obtain a search warrant .... And there is no suggestion that a search warrant
could not easily and conveniently have been obtained." Id. at 394. Mincey clearly holds that
when searching homes for evidence of crime, police need either warrants or exigent
circumstances-defined as whether time suffices to seek a warrant. Id.
178 Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003). On slightly different facts,
Roe v. Tex. Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir. 2002), strongly
suggests that the Fifth Circuit's view falls in line with that of the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits. Roe explored the propriety of warrantless strip searches designed to uncover evidence
of child abuse. In Roe, the Texas officials concluded that a child (Jackie) may have been
sexually abused. During her first contact with Jackie, a social worker strip-searched her in an
effort to uncover evidence of abuse. The Fifth Circuit rejected the state's argument that "special
needs" justified dispensing with the traditional exigent circumstances requirement. Where "a
child protective services search is ... intimately intertwined with law enforcement ....
traditional Fourth Amendment" standards apply. 299 F.3d at 407. Where "exigent
circumstances" exist, no warrant is required. Id. (citing Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581,
604-05 (2d Cir. 1999)). "In non-exigent circumstances, the worker then has time to obtain a
warrant either personally to conduct a visual body cavity search or to have a physician perform
it." Id. (emphasis added).
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that deductive tools alone cannot produce a proper result. While Supreme Court
doctrine and constitutional comparisons must be considered, it is also important to
explore the history that surrounds child protection and rescue. Before turning to
the various constitutional doctrines and results handed down by the high Court,
the next Part briefly summarizes the history of rescue and removal in America.
III. REMOVAL'S HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Why Remove Children?
A father's right to the care, custody, and control of his children is of ancient
origin. Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1765, observed that "'[t]he
ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over his children;
upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking away .... 11179
Blackstone observed that "children lived in 'the empire of the father' until they
reached twenty-one,"' 180 and the father's common law "right to the custody, labor,
and earnings of his minor children" was sacred.181 Government had little (if any)
room to interfere with a father's right to his children.
This common law deference, however, was due only affluent parents. English
Poor Laws, which were a "response to the social and economic changes of the
declining feudal age,"'182 modified parental rights by authorizing the removal of
children from poor families.183 Following removal, children were often impressed
into the service of more prosperous families. 184 A dual system of family law thus
emerged in England prior to the American Revolution. "[T]he family law of the
poor ... [which] evolved as an integral part of the labor and poor law systems,
was the creation of Parliament and was then as today primarily statutory. The
family law of the rest of the community was created by the common-law
courts." 185 While rich children enjoyed familial privilege, poor children
experienced a state-supported system that closely approached slavery.186
179 Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 310 (2002) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *440).
180 Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441).
181 Id. at 310.
182 Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23
S.C. L. REv. 205, 210 (1971).
183 See Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 279 (1964).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 261. See also Rendleman, supra note 182, at 211 (observing that Blackstone
recognized this distinction).
186 Rendleman, supra note 182, at 212.
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The American colonies received and recognized this dual system.
"Seventeenth century laws of Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and
Pennsylvania, for example, specifically authorized magistrates to 'b[i]nd out' or
indenture children of the poor over parental objections. 1 87 Because prosperous
parents in the late eighteenth century continued to enjoy complete control over
their children, it is impossible to draw any singular conclusion about what the
federal Framers thought about familial rights and "child abuse." Not only was
child abuse unknown to the Framers, no remedial mechanism existed for
rectifying abusive parental practices as opposed to poverty.
States' attitudes toward families living in poverty changed little between the
Revolution and the Civil War.188 Still, an onslaught of immigration forced many
states to modify their placement systems. Rather than rely on apprenticeships and
indentures, the first half of the nineteenth century brought reformatories and
"houses of refuge." As an adjunct to almshouses, which focused on poor adults,
the "House of Refuge Movement" facilitated the institutionalization of poor
children. 189 New York's law (enacted in 1824), for example, provided a charter to
the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents to erect a "House of
Refuge" for minor vagrants, delinquents, and criminals. 190 Their names
notwithstanding, these Houses of Refuge were not designed to shelter or protect
abused children; rather, "the undertaking was a matter of crime and delinquency
prevention, aimed at saving predelinquent youth." 191 The Movement's essential
thesis was that poverty correlated with "moral degeneracy."' 192 Removing poor
children (and their parents) from the population-at-large ridded society of actual
or potential moral deviants, offered correction, and furthered crime-control. 193
True reform efforts geared toward protecting children did not emerge until
after the Civil War. And even then, "reform" was guarded and cautious. The
187 Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform, "Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 688, 702 (1998).
188 tenBroek, supra note 183, at 297.
189 See Marvin Ventrell, From Cause to Profession: The Development of Children Law
and Practice, 32-JAN COLO. LAW. 65, 66 (2003).
190 See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187, 1190 (1971).
191 Id. at 1190-91.
192 Id. at 1199.
193 See id. at 1207 ("The presumption remained that this was all a means to the end of
crime prevention."); Rendelman, supra note 182, at 244.
[It is evident from the decisions that small children were being taken from their parents
not because there was any breach of the criminal law by either the parents or the children
and not because of any intentional failing of the parents, but simply because the parents
were poor and behaved as poor people always have.
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genesis of this late nineteenth century reform movement can be found in two
celebrated child abuse cases tried in New York City in 1871 and 1874,
respectively. 194 Both cases involved children who had been horribly abused by
their parents. Henry Bergh, the founder of New York's Society for Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, used
a writ de homine replegiando (similar to a writ of habeas corpus), ... to remove
the girls and ultimately have them placed by the New York Special Sessions
Court in safe care. It is not clear under what authority the court acted; it probably
saw itself as exercising its equitable authority, having taken criminal jurisdiction
over the abusers. 195
These two cases spawned creation of the New York Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children in 1874.196 In the years that followed, more and more cities
followed suit. "Led by wealthy private philanthropists, [these societies] amassed
unprecedented legal authority to scrutinize parental behavior, arrest parents, and
remove thousands of children."197
Even though the New York Reform Movement's mandate was protection,
pure and simple, it continued to labor under a distinction between rich and poor.
"From the start, [the New York Society] focused on families that had not been
successful in the wage labor economy, operating on the principle that this
economic failure had been caused by some crucial moral or character flaw." 198
Over the entire course of the nineteenth century, common law courts and legal
writers in the United States remained highly respectful of the control that parents,
particularly fathers, exercised over their households and children, and committed
to doctrines that made legal intervention to counter parental excess or abuse very
unlikely. 199
So long as a father provided for his children in a "proper" way--one defined by
the various charitable, religious, and philanthropic organizations that administered
the reform laws-there was little chance of official intervention. Discipline that
today would clearly be labeled abusive fell beyond the bounds of governmental
control.
194 See Ventrell, supra note 189, at 66 (discussing cases involving Emily (1871) and Mary
Ellen (1874)).
195 See Ventrell, supra note 189, at 66. See also Davidson, supra note 13, at 766
(describing Bergh's use of a "special habeas corpus-type writ" to remove the children).
196 Ventrell, supra note 189, at 67.
197 Hasday, supra note 179, at 302.
198 Hasday, supra note 179, at 304-05.
199 Hasday, supra note 179, at 311.
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At the close of the nineteenth century, the New York Reform Movement-
which to this time had been primarily private (though officially chartered)--
ceded control to state and local administrative bodies. "'[C]hildren's guardians'
boards were created, marking the beginning of government taking primary
responsibility for aiding abused, neglected, and abandoned children rather than, as
in earlier times, the charitable sector, such as Societies for Prevention of Cruelty
to Children, Children's Aid Societies, and religious groups. '200 Cook County,
Illinois created the first juvenile court in 1899, which served as a prototype for
modem governmental oversight of juvenile delinquents in America.20 1
Eighteenth and nineteenth century America's division between rich and poor
manifested itself in at least two important ways. First, juvenile dependency in
eighteenth and nineteenth century America was not distinguished from juvenile
delinquency. "[T]he distinction between neglected children and delinquent
children, which is of great importance in the twentieth century, had virtually no
meaning in the nineteenth-century predelinquency system."202 Second, poor
children were targeted because they were delinquent and likely to become
criminals, not because they were dependent and abused. Simply put, nineteenth
century America's parens patriae interest in children was a function of crime-
control, 20 3 not the well-being of children. Protection was important, but it was
protection of society from children, rather than protection of children from their
parents.
America's use of poverty to justify removal did not change until the first
quarter of the twentieth century, when states began passing "mothers' pension
laws." 204 These measures, passed by a large majority of states by 1920,
authorized local governments to provide direct financial support to poor mothers,
[and] differed from the child cruelty societies in two important institutional
respects .... First, [they] established completely governmental programs ....
Second, and more crucially, [they] primarily accomplished their aims through
the provision and refusal of much needed financial aid, building on a growing
consensus among reformers of the period that this strategy was both more
effective, and more cost-efficient, than removing children from their parents'
custody.205
200 Davidson, supra note 13, at 766.
201 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (crediting Cook County as the prototype for
modem governmental oversight of American juvenile delinquents).
202 Fox, supra note 190, at 1192.
203 Fox, supra note 190, at 1193.
204 See Hasday, supra note 179, at 348.
205 Hasday, supra note 179, at 348.
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While it appears that mothers' pension laws perpetuated much of the nineteenth
century's moral philosophy, 206 their advent still marked an important turning
point in poor families' rights. Even the poor were allowed to have (and keep)
families.
"[By] mid century all states had government agencies that provided statewide
services to abused, neglected, and abandoned children. '20 7 This was fueled in part
by federal spending measures, such as the Aid to Dependent Children Act, which
was passed as part of the Social Security Act of 1935.208 At approximately this
same time, the medical community also took note of child abuse. In 1946, Dr.
John Caffey reported the case histories of six "battered" children.209 The dialogue
that followed "began the modem era in our understanding of child abuse and our
response to it." 2 10
In 1961, the American Academy of Pediatrics organized its first conference
on "The Battered Child Syndrome."211 The first model child abuse law was
drafted at this conference.212 The following year, a report by the same name was
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. 213 This report
"brought the problem [of child abuse] to a wider audience, not only in medicine
but in government as well .... ,"214 By 1966, "every state in the Union passed a
child-abuse reporting law."215
In 1974, Congress's enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA)216 marked "its first direct action to address child maltreatment
within the home .... " 217 This Act conditioned federal grants on the development
of programs geared toward preventing child abuse. "Child abuse," in turn, was
defined by CAPTA as "physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent
treatment, or maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen by a person who is
responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances which indicate that the
206 See Hasday, supra note 179, at 348.
207 Davidson, supra note 13, at 766.
208 See Hasday, supra note 179, at 357. This federal statute was renamed Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1962. Id.
209 See Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
210 Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
211 See Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
212 Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
213 See Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
214 Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
215 Richman, supra note 65, at 220.
2 16 See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 3, 88 Stat. 4
(1974).
217 Davidson, supra note 13, at 767.
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child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby .... ,,218 In 1980 and
1997, Congress passed additional spending measures, the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act219 and the Adoption and Safe Families Act,220
respectively. Both measures attempted to weigh historical preferences for
biological families and parental rights against evolving community concerns for
children's safety. The 1980 Act conditioned removal and termination of parental
rights on a state's making "reasonable efforts" to correct familial problems.221
The 1997 Act, in turn, continued to insist that states make "reasonable efforts" to
restore families, but also encouraged timely adoption as a viable alternative. 222
Although this teetering balance has yet to be solved, it is thus clear today that
"dependency" in the United States is primarily, if not exclusively, a function of
child safety.
B. How to Remove Children?
While the substantive evolution of delinquency-dependency laws in the
United States is relatively clear, the procedural developments that accompanied
them are murky. At common law, procedural protections for poor parents did not
exist. Church wardens and overseers had absolute discretion to remove poor
children from their homes and press them into the service of others.223 There was
no such thing as judicial review, either before or after a child's removal. This
approach was apparently adopted throughout the colonies prior to the American
Revolution and remained following the adoption of the Federal Constitution.224
218 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 3, 88 Stat. 4, 5
(1974).
219 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980).
220 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
221 See Dolce, supra note 16, at 556 (observing that the "Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 ("AACWA") ... sought to better ensure that children are only removed
from their families of origin if 'reasonable efforts' are made to prevent the need for removal.").
222 See GAO REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES,
COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 17, at 1
(explaining that the 1997 Act "clarifying the circumstances under which states are not required
to try to prevent a child's removal from home or to return a foster child home allows states to
forgo services to preserve or reunite the biological family").
223 See Ventrell, supra note 189, at 66; tenBroek, supra note 183, at 279.
224 However, it is worth noting that the colonies received-and ultimately rejected-
many British practices, including groundless, arbitrary searches of homes and businesses. See
Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man's Home is His Castle? ": Reflections on the Home, the Family, and
Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 175, 203 (2002). The Fourth Amendment, according to modem wisdom, placed the
judiciary between executive license and American privacy.
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States in antebellum America, which remained free from the constraints of
the Federal Constitution,225 appear to have acquiesced in this practice. At least,
there is no authority suggesting they did not. During the House of Refuge
Movement in the first half of the nineteenth century, delinquent children were
regularly snatched from the streets and sent to institutions.226 Still, there is some
evidence of judicial review during this formative period. In the famous case of Ex
parte Crouse,227 a young girl was committed to government's care "by virtue of a
warrant under the hand and seal of... a justice of the peace of the county of
Philadelphia .... -228 The girl's mother initiated the commitment proceedings
after concluding that her daughter "by reason of vicious conduct, has rendered her
control beyond [her] power .... -"229 The relevant Pennsylvania statute, passed in
1835, authorized commitment for this reason, but only by an "alderman or justice
of the peace." 230 It was apparently not enough that the mother wanted the child
committed; an alderman or justice of the peace had to agree. Moreover, while the
father's subsequent habeas corpus challenge proved unsuccessful, 23' his use of
the great writ demonstrates that some form of judicial review was available as
early as the middle of the nineteenth century. Read optimistically, Crouse reflects
two layers of judicial review: one before commitment (by an alderman or justice
of the peace) and one after (through the great writ of habeas corpus). Granted,
Crouse did not speak to whether a child could be temporarily institutionalized
225 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (observing that protections
in Bill of Rights were not intended to apply to states and their local agencies).
22 6 See Janet Gilbert, Richard Grimm & John Pamham, Applying Therapeutic Principles
to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REv. 1153, 1158
(2001) (describing history of the House of Refuge Movement).
22 7 Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 9 (Pa. 1839).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 At length, the statute authorized the House of Refuge to take custody
in either of the following modes, viz. First: infants committed by an alderman or
justice of the peace on the complaint and due proof made to him by the parent,
guardian or next friend of such infant, that by reason of incorrigible or vicious
conduct such infant has rendered his or her control beyond the power of such parent
.... Second: infants committed by the authority aforesaid, where complaint and due
proof have been made [because] ... of vagrancy, or of incorrigible or vicious
conduct, and that from the moral depravity or otherwise of the parent or next friend in
whose custody such infant may be, such parent or next friend is incapable or
unwilling to exercise the proper care and discipline over such incorrigible or vicious
infant. Third: infants committed by the Courts of this commonwealth in the mode
provided by the act to which this is a supplement [meaning the Act of 1826, which
authorized detention based upon vagrancy, criminal charge, or criminal conviction].
Id. at 10.
231 Id. at 12.
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during the course of the commitment proceeding. It addressed only the terminal
issue of whether the child's commitment was valid.232
As described above,233 private societies that emerged as part of New York's
Reform Movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century exercised
enormous power and discretion. Although Henry Bergh resorted to habeas corpus
to rescue Emily and Mary Ellen,234 society agents most often simply "followed
children back to their homes,"235 arrested their parents, and seized the children.236
Because removals were parcel to the arrests of the parents, they seem to have
occurred without prior or accompanying judicial process. Process came, if at all,
as part of the criminal proceedings against the parents. "Once a child had been
removed from her parents at the New York society's instigation or with its help,"
moreover, "the courts were extremely reluctant to allow visitation or to release the
child, unless the society agreed. 237
The first half of the twentieth century saw little change in the procedures that
accompanied removals. Judicial review was available but tended to follow
removal rather than precede it. While the law of search and seizure evolved to
safeguard adults in the latter half of the twentieth century, 238 these new-found
procedural protections were seldom extended to juveniles. 239 In many states, for
example, juveniles were subject to arrest with or without warrants, regardless of
traditional probable cause.240 As the Supreme Court explained in In re Gault,
"[t]he early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the
fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with
hardened criminals." 24 1  They thus discarded the "apparent rigidities,
technicalities, and harshness which they observed in both substantive and
232 Id. at 11.
233 See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
235 Hasday, supra note 179, at 307.
236 Hasday, supra note 179, at 307.
237 Hasday, supra note 179, at 308. In twenty years (1881-1900), the New York society
"brought 52,860 criminal cases, resulting in 49,330 convictions (a 93.3% success rate). During
the same period, the society removed 90,078 children with judicial approval. It exercised
enormous discretion over their placement, and put the overwhelming majority in institutions."
Id. at 307-08.
238 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to exclusionary rule).
239 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) ("In practically all jurisdictions, there are rights
granted to adults which are withheld from juveniles.").
24 0 See id. at 1 I n.7 (observing that Arizona's arrest law did not protect juveniles).
241 Id. at 15.
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procedural criminal law" for juvenile delinquents.242 In their stead, reformers left
juveniles with promises of compassion and fairness as opposed to due process.243
Gault, decided in 1967, was a watershed for juvenile rights. The Court in
Gault held that while juveniles are entitled to some form of due process in the
context of delinquency proceedings, they do not necessarily enjoy all the
protections enjoyed by adults.244 The Court did not address pre-trial procedures,
such as arrests and practices surrounding pre-trial detentions, nor did it import
adults' protections jot-for-jot into the realm of juvenile delinquency.245 Still, its
holding made clear that juveniles are entitled to some constitutional
protections.246 More importantly, it emphasized the inherent value of process:
"Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and
inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of
remedy. '247 The Court thus ruled that juveniles are entitled to proper notice,
counsel, and an opportunity to defend themselves at trial.248
Following Gault's landmark holding that children enjoy constitutional
protections, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
prepared the Uniform Juvenile Court Act of 1968 (the Model Act)249 to
implement needed changes in America's juvenile justice system. 250 As was the
accepted historical norm, § 13 of the Model Act addressed dependent and
delinquent children together:
(a) A child may be taken into custody:
(1) pursuant to an order of the court under this Act;
(2) pursuant to the laws of arrest;
242 Id.
243 See id. at 18 ("Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.").
244 See e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (plurality) (holding that
juveniles are not entitled to juries in delinquency proceedings). Justice Blackmun observed in
McKeiver that "[t]he Court ... has not yet said that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult
.. are to be enforced or made available to the juvenile in his delinquency proceeding." Id. at
533.
245 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
246 Id. at 55.
2 4 7 Id. at 19_20.
248 Id. at41.
249 The Uniform Juvenile Court Act, which was approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1968, was
officially changed to a Model Act in 1985. See MODEL JUVENtLE COuRT Acr, Historical Notes,
9A U.L.A. 1 (1968). The Model Act was withdrawn in 1996 as being obsolete.
2501Id.
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(3) by a law enforcement officer [or duly authorized officer of the court] if
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is suffering from illness or
injury or is in immediate danger from his surroundings, and that his removal is
necessary; or
(4) by a law enforcement officer [or duly authorized officer of the court] if
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child has run away from his
parents, guardian, or other custodian.
(b) The taking of a child into custody is not an arrest, except for the purpose
of determining its validity under the constitution of this State or of the United
States.25 1
Notwithstanding their inclusion in a single statute, delinquent and dependent
children were still treated quite differently. Delinquent children were subject to
the "laws of arrest," which, at that time, most often authorized unconditional,
unilateral action by police. Dependent children, those who suffered "illness ...
injury or [were] in immediate danger," meanwhile, could be summarily
removed-that is, without prior judicial authorization-by a law enforcement
officer only when "necessary." 2 52 For dependents, judicial authorization ex ante
was preferred, as made clear by sections 14 and 15 of the Model Act. Section 14
required that children who had been removed without court orders
not be detained or placed in shelter care prior to the hearing on the petition unless
[the child's] detention or care is required to protect the person or property of
others or of the child or because the child may abscond or be removed from the
jurisdiction of the co-nt or because [the child] has no parent, guardian, or
custodian or other person able to provide supervision and care for [the child] and
return [the child] to the court when required .... 253
Section 15, in turn, required that a "person taking a child into custody, with
all reasonable speed and without first taking the child elsewhere ... release the
child to his parents.., upon their promise to bring the child before the court when
requested... unless his detention or shelter is warranted or required under section
14 .... -254 Read together, sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Model Act expressed a
clear preference for judicial involvement and supervision. Section 13's necessity
requirement allowed unilateral, summary action only when needed to
251 MODEL JUVENILE COURT ACT, § 13, 9A U.L.A. 22 (1968). The Model Act, its drafters
observed, "provides for judicial intervention when necessary for the care of deprived children
and for the treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent and unruly children, but under defined
rules of law and through fair and constitutional procedure." MODEL JUVENILE COURT ACT,
Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 2 (1968).
252 MODEL JUVENILE COURT ACT, § 13, 9A U.L.A. 22-23 (1968).
253 Id. § 14.
254 Id. § 15(a)(1).
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immediately protect children or prevent flight. In the absence of these pressing
needs, the Model Act called for pre-deprivation process.255
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS: WHERE DOES RESCUE FIT IN?
A. Constitutional Family Law
The Supreme Court has long recognized a basic, fundamental right to raise
children.256 The Court's holdings, moreover, have always assumed that this right
is shared by rich and poor alike. Four generations ago, the Supreme Court in
Meyer v. Nebraska ruled that parents have a fundamental right to choose what is
best for their children.257 In Meyer, the Court struck down as violative of
substantive due process a state law that forbade the teaching of various languages
in private schools.2 58 The Court's logic was grounded in Lochner v. New York,
which rather ignobly held that bakers have a constitutional right to contract as
they see fit, free from governmental constraint.259 Parents, too, are endowed with
a fundamental liberty of contract, such that they have the right to choose the
content of their children's education. Two years later, the Court employed similar
255 While it is not clear that "necessary" equates with the constitutional understanding of
"exigent circumstances" expressed in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), such a
correlation makes sense. Warrantless removals are only necessary when warrants are not
immediately obtainable. Warrants are not immediately obtainable because of exigent
circumstances. Georgia, which adopted the Model Act in 1971, seems to have recognized this
logic. See Michael R. Beeman, Note, Investigating Child Abuse: The Fourth Amendment and
Investigatory Home Visits, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1034, 1053 n.147 (1989) (noting that Mincey's
exigency requirement was properly applied to a child abuse investigation in Coker v. State, 164
Ga. App. 493, 496-97, 297 S.E.2d 68, 71-72 (1982)). Wisconsin, however, which also adopted
the Model Act, appears to have gone in the other direction, allowing warrantless searches in
child abuse investigations that would not likely survive scrutiny in other contexts. See State v.
Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 456, 340 N.W.2d 516, 524 (1983) (suggesting that Wisconsin's
necessity exception in the context of child abuse differs from Mincey's description of exigent
circumstances) (cited in Beeman, supra, at 1053 n.147).
256 The Supreme Court has not decided whether children have an identical or symmetrical
right to be cared for by their parents. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1988)
(plurality) ("We have never had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship."). For an excellent
discussion of children's emerging rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, see David D.
Meyer, The Modest Promise of Children's Relationship Rights, I I WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
1117 (2003) (observing that, while parental rights are well-established, children's rights are still
developing).
257 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state law that prevented
teaching of German to children in schools).
258 Id. at 403.
259 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law that limited
hours of employment for bakers).
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logic to strike down an Oregon law that mandated public education. In Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, the Court held that parents are constitutionally free to send their
children to private schools if they choose.260 While the Lochneresque logic used
in those two cases has been swept away, their authority stands to this day.
Whether a function of substantive familial rights under the Due Process Clause,
or protected speech and association under the First Amendment, Meyer and
Pierce remain solid.
By 1972, when the Court decided in Stanley v. Illinois261 that neither fathers
nor mothers can have their children taken from them absent a particularized
showing that they are "unfit" as parents,262 it was clear that parents enjoyed
exceptional protections under the Federal Constitution. The Court in Stanley
stated emphatically that a parent's right to his children is fundamental--"It is
plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children 'come(s) to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements" 263-a conclusion that has been reiterated in
later opinions. In Troxel v. Granville, for example, which struck down
Washington's grandparent-visitation law, Justice O'Connor stated that "it cannot
now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions conceming the care,
custody, and control of their children." 264 These rights, Justice O'Connor
observed, are "perhaps the oldest of fundamental liberty interests recognized by
this Court. '265
The Court has also recognized procedural protections for parents.
Importantly, in Stanley, the Court "conclude[d] that, as a matter of due process of
260 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (striking down state a law that
prohibited parents from sending children to private schools).
261 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (concluding that fathers' children cannot be
taken from them absent findings that they are unfit).
262 In Stanley, the "Court held that the State of Illinois was barred, as a matter of both due
process and equal protection, from taking custody of the children of an unwed father, absent a
hearing and a particularized finding that the father was an unfit parent." Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246,247-48 (1978).
263 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949)).
264 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). Justices Souter, id. at
77, and Thomas, id. at 80, concurred in Justice O'Connor's conclusion that parental rights are
generally protected by substantive due process.
265 Id. at 65. This is not to say that parents have an absolute right to direct the actions of
their children. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for example, the Court ruled
that a law prohibiting the sale of merchandise in public places by minors could be applied to a
child distributing literature at the behest of her guardian. The state's interest in the well-being of
children sometimes overrides parental controls. Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding that parents have a constitutional right to keep their children out of school after a
certain age).
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law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children
were taken from him .... -266 Although the Court was speaking to procedural
protections that must accompany permanent (as opposed to temporary)
deprivations, much of its logic would seem to extend to rescues. The Court, after
all, observed that even temporary separation can cause suffering: "Surely, in the
case before us, if there is delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner
suffers from the deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from
uncertainty and dislocation.' '267 Stanley thus seems to stand for the proposition
that interference in family matters ought to be avoided whenever possible.
Respect for familial autonomy would be furthered not only by judicial filters that
precede permanent separations, but also by judicial filters that come before
temporary removals.
Several Supreme Court opinions flesh out these procedural protections, yet
none address the propriety of warrantless rescues. In Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, the Court suggested that indigent parents may, under certain
circumstances, be entitled to the appointment of counsel in termination
proceedings. 268 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court concluded that a termination of
parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 269 More
recently, in ML.B. v. S.L.J., the Court held that an indigent parent is entitled to a
"record of sufficient completeness" to enable an appellate court to thoroughly
review a termination order. 270
The procedural protections afforded non-fundamental interests attest to the
obvious importance of parental rights. The Court has been quite flexible in terms
of the process necessarily due aggrieved persons when garden-variety life, liberty,
and property interests are at stake. This has translated into skeletal proceedings in
many non-fundamental settings. In Goss v. Lopez, for example, the Court ruled
that minors are entitled to minimal process before being suspended for
disciplinary reasons from public schools.271 Judges are not required and the child
need not be given a full-blown opportunity to challenge the reasons for
266 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (emphasis added).
267 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
268 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981) (observing that in complicated
cases, like those relying on expert opinions, counsel might be demanded as a matter of due
process, but holding that appointed counsel is not always necessary).
269 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding that termination of parental
rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence).
270 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (holding that an indigent parent is entitled
to free record in order to contest termination of parental rights) (quoting Mayer v. Chicago, 404
U.S. 189, 198 (1971)).
271 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975) (holding that a minor can be suspended
from school with minimal procedural protection).
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suspension.272 In Ingraham v. Wright, meanwhile, the Court held that children's
constitutional liberty interests in being free from the infliction of appreciable
physical pain by their teachers can be protected by post-deprivation relief 273
Children can thus be spanked in public schools without prior process.
It is safe to say, I think, that the more important the right, the more formal the
process due. Because of their importance, familial rights and the general right to
remain free from institutional restraint have generally received more procedural
protection than non-fundamental interests, like attending public school274 or
driving a car.275 Indeed, when "fundamental" rights-those that demand
heightened substantive judicial scrutiny-are at stake, the Court has even
occasionally required affirmative governmental assistance, like waiving fees276
and providing counsel. 277 In contrast, it has not done so in non-fundamental
contexts.278 The same goes for heightened evidentiary standards. Only when
people (adults and children alike) are removed from their natural environments
must the state explain its substantive decisions with something more than a
preponderance of the evidence. 279
This digression is not meant to imply that the procedural protections afforded
the parent-child relationship must always exceed some minimal baseline
established in non-fundamental settings. Indeed, interference with a parent's
access to her children is sometimes judged by a less-suspicious standard. The law
2 72 Id. at 584 (requiring only "an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian").
273 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (holding that post-deprivation process
is sufficient in context of corporal punishment in public schools).
2 74 See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 565 (holding that a student has a protected liberty interest
in attending public school).
275 See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (holding that a driver has a liberty
interest in a license but that post-depiivation process is sufficient).
276See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that an indigent is entitled to a
record of sufficient completeness to challenge termination of parental rights).
277 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a juvenile in delinquency proceeding
is entitled to counsel); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (plurality) (holding that an
indigent prisoner being transferred to a mental hospital is entitled to counsel, though not
necessarily an attorney). Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Sews., 452 U.S. 18, 30 (1981) (observing
that in complicated cases, like those relying on expert opinions, counsel might be demanded in
termination proceedings as a matter of due process, but holding that appointed counsel is not
always necessary).
278 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (holding that the
government need not waive civil filing fee for bankruptcy); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,
661 (1973) (holding there is no constitutional right to waiver of fees in civil litigation).
279 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that termination of
parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 418 (1979) (holding that civil commitment of an adult must be supported by a
minimum of clear and convincing evidence).
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of arrest, for example, concedes nothing to familial rights. A child who has
committed a crime can be seized in much the same way as an adult, 280 which
generally means without prior process.281 Once seized, the Supreme Court made
clear in Schall v. Martin282 that a minor can be held for several days before
receiving a hearing. 283 The arrest and subsequent detention both interfere with
parental care, custody, and control. Still, their impact on familial rights renders
neither invalid.
The fundamental nature of familial rights, moreover, does not imply that
prior judicial process is always required, or that parents enjoy a full complement
of procedural protections before children are temporarily taken. All states agree
that children can be rescued without prior judicial process when time is of the
essence.284 And in Newton v. Burgin, the Supreme Court summarily ruled that ex
parte judicial proceedings can be constitutionally used to rescue children from
their homes.285 My point is that several holdings, including Stanley, Lassiter,
Santosky, and ML.B, demonstrate that families are exceptional in the
constitutional scheme of things. While familial rights are not absolute, they enjoy
more constitutional protection than most other rights and interests. This does not
mean states do not have a compelling interest in protecting children. Rather, it
simply suggests that parental rights must be constitutionally accommodated.
B. Arrests, Searches, and Seizures
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the Fourth
Amendment's application in the context of child rescues, lower courts tend to
agree that the seizure of a child, whether from inside or outside the home, is a
2 80 See, e.g., Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (assuming applicability of
Fourth Amendment arrest standards in a case involving the arrest of a juvenile).
281 See infra notes 315-319 and accompanying text.
282 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 (1983) (holding that juvenile delinquents may be
taken into preventive detention and be held for several days without a hearing).
283 The Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125-26 (1975), ruled that
criminal suspects arrested without warrants are entitled to hearings within a matter of days
following arrest. The Court in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991),
clarified Gerstein 's holding to mean that criminal suspects arrested without warrants should
ordinarily receive hearings within forty-eight hours. Many lower courts today have squared
Schall with Gerstein and Riverside, so that juvenile delinquents must also receive hearings
within forty-eight hours. See, e.g., Corder v. Rogerson, 192 F.3d 1165, 1168 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that there is "no reason to believe" that the Schall and Gerstein standards are
different).
284 See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
285 Newton v. Burgin, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), affg 363 F. Supp. 782 (W.D.N.C. 1973)
(summarily affirming the lower court's conclusion that use of ex parte procedures to
temporarily remove children from their homes did not violate constitutional guarantees).
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Fourth Amendment problem.286 There is thus a unanimous conclusion that both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to rescues and removals.
The Supreme Court, for its part, has concluded that arrests raise Fourth
Amendment concerns for both adults and juveniles. In California v. Hodari D.,
for example, the Court was careful to observe in the context of a juvenile's
alleged arrest that the Fourth Amendment was "long understood" to protect
against unreasonable seizures "of the person. '287 Still, there is room to argue that
the Fourth Amendment has limited (or no) application to the removal, as opposed
to arrest, of a minor. The Supreme Court has observed on several occasions that
minors, unlike adults, have no general right to "come and go at will."288 Children
are always in someone's or something's custody. Like prisoners,289 the argument
goes, children have less liberty than free adults. Removing a child is nothing more
than shifting custody, which inside a prison has long been held to lack Fourth
Amendment overtones. 290
The argument, I think, proves too much. If true in the context of rescues and
removals, then why not also true with children's arrests? If true for the Fourth
Amendment, why not also true for the Due Process Clause, which has long been
interpreted to protect children's procedural rights?291 The Court has expressly
stated in this latter context that "children have a protected liberty interest in
'freedom from institutional restraints,' even absent the stigma of being labeled
'delinquent' or 'mentally ill'. '292 The better approach, it seems, is to recognize
that the Fourth Amendment applies to removals and rescues, just as it applies to
28 6 See, e.g., Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731,
747 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 2003) ("Just as ... the Fourth Amendment restricts entries and inspections
into private homes, it applies also to the removal of children by social workers."). These courts
also agree that parents can assert the Fourth Amendment rights of their children. See, e.g.,
Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 738 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Undoubtedly, parents may assert
their children's Fourth Amendment rights on behalf of their children.").
287 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (emphasis added).
288 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (upholding an INS regulation allowing
release of deportable children only to parents or guardians).
289 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that an inmate has no
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in his jail cell).
290 See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976) (holding that an inmate can be
transferred from medium to maximum security prison without process).
291 See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
292 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 317 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Breed
v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding that a juvenile delinquency proceeding is subject to due
process) (citations omitted); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that a child is entitled
to a hearing to test a parent's decision to commit the child to a mental health facility)). The
court in Walsh v. Erie County Dep 't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 746-47
(N.D. Ohio 2003), perhaps put it best: "There is, the defendants' understanding and assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding, no social worker exception to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment."
2004]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
juvenile arrests. Children do not fall outside its terms, just as they do not forfeit
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Their rights may differ, but they
exist nonetheless.
Another intriguing question is whether application of the Fourth Amendment
ought to preclude procedural and substantive analyses under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.2 93 The Court has occasionally ruled that
Fourth Amendment standards are exclusive. For instance, the Court concluded in
Graham v. Connor that excessive force by a police officer during the course of an
arrest is to be assessed only under the Fourth, and not the Fourteenth,
Amendment.294 This ruling came after several years of experimentation by lower
courts with both substantive and procedural due process.2 95 Despite the logical
application of both clauses, the Court ultimately opted for the Fourth
Amendment.296 A similar conclusion was reached in Albright v. Oliver, where the
Court ruled that criminal suspects' procedural rights during the course of their
293 Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment would still have to be used to incorporate
Fourth Amendment standards and apply them to the states. But this is quite different from using
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to create substantive and procedural
protections. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens observes that the Due Process Clause encompasses
three different kinds of constitutional protection. First, it incorporates specific protections
defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the State, as well as the Federal Government, must
comply with the commands in the First and Eighth Amendments; so too, the State must
respect the guarantees in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Second, it contains a
substantive component, sometimes referred to as "substantive due process," which bars
certain arbitrary government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them." Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as
"procedural due process": the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without
giving him a fair trial, nor may it take property without providing appropriate procedural
safeguards.
Id. (citations omitted).
294 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that excessive force claims
against police officers are actionable only under the Fourth Amendment).
295 See Brown, supra note 46, at 821-25 (describing the history of procedural due
process's use to federalize garden-variety torts). Note that where the Fourth Amendment does
not apply, because, say, of the lack of a seizure, substantive due process can be applied. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (holding that a high speed chase by police
was not a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment and did not violate substantive due
process). See generally MARK R. BROwN & KI- KINPORTS, CONSTrUTIONAL LITIGATION
UNDER § 1983 58-61 (2003) (discussing the differences and similarities between the Fourth
Amendment, substantive, and procedural due process). The ultimate question under substantive
due process is whether the government's conduct "shocks the conscience" of the court. Id. at
59.
296 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
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arrests are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and not procedural
due process. 297
Due process, however, has been invoked too often in the context of juvenile
rights to be discarded at this late juncture. In Schall v. Martin, for example, the
Court analyzed the propriety of post-arrest juvenile detention under the Due
Process Clause, as opposed to its Fourth Amendment counterpart.2 9 8 While the
Court's due process analysis closely tracked the Fourth Amendment's application
to adults,299 leaving open the possibility that the two provisions' treatment of
adults and minors might eventually merge, this has not yet happened. Indeed, the
Court continues to rely on the Due Process Clause in the context of juveniles'
rights precisely because of its flexibility. 30 0 It seems doubtful at this stage that that
the Court would be willing to eschew flexibility in favor of the more rigid
requirements of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Lower courts' near-unanimous conclusion that both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments apply to rescues accordingly seems sensible and correct.
Any other course would require not only reworking existing precedent; it would
also prove logically fragile under the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property.30 1 As described more fully below, the Court
in Good ruled that both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to
forfeitures of real estate.30 2
This is not to say, however, that the requirements of both constitutional
provisions are necessarily the same. Their respective histories, policies, and places
in the constitutional scheme could lead to divergent results. The Second Circuit in
Tenenbaum,30 3 for example, found overlap between the two Amendments in
terms of timing,30 4 but also recognized potential differences in terms of probable
297 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (holding that probable cause in the
criminal setting is judged under the Fourth Amendment).
298 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984) (holding that juvenile detainees are
entitled to post-deprivation probable cause hearings).
299 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that suspects arrested without
warrants are entitled to post-arrest probable cause determinations within a reasonable time).
300 See e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (upholding detention of juvenile aliens
under substantive and procedural due process).
301 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993) (holding
that summary seizure of real estate in the absence of exigent circumstances violates procedural
due process).
302 Good, 510 U.S. at 52. See infra notes 525-41 and accompanying text.
303 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 601 (2d Cir. 1999).
304Id. at 605. Whatever differences might exist between Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment standards, the Second Circuit decided that dispensing with pre-deprivation judicial
process is not among them. Id. ("Whatever Fourth Amendment analysis is employed, then, it
results in a test for present purposes similar to the procedural due-process standard."). Whether
viewed through the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, according to the Second Circuit,
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cause, the need for sworn affidavits, and the requisite neutrality of magistrates and
judges.305 Logic does not dictate a lockstep approach. Fourth and Fourteenth
standards can differ.
Consider, in particular, the peculiar problem of location under modem Fourth
Amendment analysis. Homes historically have been afforded the utmost Fourth
Amendment protection.30 6 Crossing the threshold of the home-whether to
search for evidence or make an arrest-breaches fundamental notions of privacy.
The Supreme Court has made clear that searches and arrests inside the home,
absent exigent circumstances, must be accompanied by warrants.30 7 In contrast,
searches3 08 and arrests 30 9 outside the home generally need not be judicially
authorized beforehand. Location is critical to the constitutional conclusion.
Procedural due process, however, weighs more than just the private interest at
stake. According to Mathews v. Eldridge,310 the state's administrative needs and,
perhaps most importantly, the risk of erroneous decisions in the absence of prior
process 311 are also considered. The Fourth Amendment's focus is privacy. The
Fourteenth's is certainty. While results under the Fourth and Fourteenth
"judicial authorization makes a fundamental contribution to the proper resolution of the tension
among the interests of the child, the parents, and the State." Id. at 604. See also Wallis v.
Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1137 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he same legal standard applies in
evaluating Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for the removal of children..
305 Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604.
306 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, at 138.
30 7 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that arrests inside the
home ordinarily must be supported by either a warrant or exigent circumstances: "Absent
exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.");
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (holding that seriousness of offense by itself does
not create exigent circumstances; rather, the question is whether circumstances would allow
police time to seek a warrant). Assuming the owner consents to an officer's entry, of course,
neither a warrant nor exigent circumstances are needed to make an arrest inside. See LAFAvE
ET AL., supra note 18, at 194.
308 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 3.2.
309 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,431-32 (1976) (holding that felony arrests
outside the home need not be supported by warrants).
310 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that post-deprivation process
in federal disability case is all that is constitutionally required).
311 The Court in Mathews stated that:
[f]irst [to be considered is] the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Matthews is discussed more fully infra notes 516-41 and
accompanying text.
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Amendments may sometimes prove the same, competing policies and histories
could direct separate outcomes. Lockstep logic should thus be avoided.
It would also be wrong, I believe, to assume any direct link between rescue
and arrest within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. Granted, an analogy of
this sort can be tempting. If children can be arrested outside the home without a
warrant,312 why can they not be rescued outside the home without one? If they
are protected inside the home from warrantless arrest,313 why not afford them the
same protection from rescue and removal?
Arrests and rescues should be addressed separately for several reasons. The
first is historical. At common law, "a peace officer was permitted to arrest without
a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a
felony not committed in his presence if there was reasonable grounds for making
the arrest. '314 According to the Supreme Court in United States v. Watson, 3 15 this
was also "the prevailing rule under state constitutions and statutes" when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.316 Because the Second Congress adopted this
ancient standard in the late eighteenth century and "plainly decided against
conditioning warrantless arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances," 317 the
Court in Watson assumed that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment could not
have meant to displace it. The Court thus ruled that warrantless felony arrests are
generally acceptable under the Fourth Amendment's exclusive terms, at least to
the extent they occur outside the home.318
312 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431-32 (1976) (holding that felony arrest
outside the home based solely on probable cause is proper).
313 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding that arrest inside the
home must generally be accompanied by warrant).
314 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 438 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
315 Id. at 419 (holding that felony arrest outside the home is proper based solely on
probable cause) (citation omitted).
3 16 Id. at 419.
3 17 Id. at 423.
318 Left undecided by Watson was whether misdemeanors committed outside the presence
of police could lead to warrantless arrests and whether warrantless arrests inside the home were
valid absent exigent circumstances. Since Watson, some states have authorized warrantless
arrests for at least some misdemeanors committed outside the presence of police. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ch. 901.15(7) (2001) (authorizing warrantless arrest for crimes of domestic violence
committed outside presence of police officer). The common law also recognized the validity of
warrantless felony arrests inside the home. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 616 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting) ("At common law, absent exigent circumstances, entries to arrest could
be made only for felony."). The majority in Payton, however, refused to allow this same
common law pedigree to displace the general Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Searches inside the home for evidence, the majority noted, must be accompanied by warrants.
"[A]n entry to arrest and an entry to search for and to seize property implicate the same interest
in preserving the privacy and the sanctity of the home, and justify the same level of
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Removal developed differently. By the time of the American Revolution,
poor laws in England had modified fathers' near-perfect right to their children.319
It was not unusual in England and colonial America for overseers and ministers to
summarily remove and bind out poor children without parental consent.320 There
were no procedural protections at all for poor parents. Similar practices continued
well into the nineteenth century. By the latter part of that century, it had become
common to "arrest" children for being poor and "delinquent."'32 1 Warrants were
not required, whether the poor child was found inside or outside the home.
Children of wealth and privilege, however, were not subject to whimsical
arrest and rescue at common law.32 2 Because they were not poor, they were not
considered delinquent.323 Child abuse laws did not exist and would not
materialize for another hundred-plus years. 324 Whether viewed through a late-
eighteenth century or late-nineteenth century lens, there was simply no reason to
rescue wealthy children from their parents.325 Unlike common law arrest,
removal was a function of socio-economic status. Poor children were removed;
rich children were protected.
This historical difference, I believe, partly explains why the constitutional law
of rescue (and removal) can diverge from that surrounding arrest. History
supports only the warrantless rescue/removal of poor children. Unless one is
willing to breathe new life into the long-discredited notion that poverty, morality,
and criminality are directly correlated, it is difficult to uncover meaningful
historical support for summary rescues.
Abuse, moreover, was not even a justification for rescue until the late
nineteenth century.326 Until 1874, states employed crime-control models to deal
with "delinquents." Juveniles were removed because they were poor, immoral,
and likely to become criminals. States had no interest in "abused" children.
"Social workers" and social welfare systems, as they are known today, simply did
not exist.32 7 There thus is scant historical support for rescuing abused children
constitutional protection." Id. at 588. Consistency, the majority found, required extending the
warrant requirement to arrests as well as searches inside the home. Id.
3 19 See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 179-204 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
327 See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1062 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, J.J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Justice Thomas observed in his dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari that:
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from abusive parents.328 Rescuing abused children is certainly a worthy and wise
development, but it is of recent vintage under American law.
Second, modem-day delinquents-who are subject to arrest 329-differ from
dependents-who are not. In order to engage in criminal acts and other forms of
anti-social behavior, delinquents necessarily will have matured beyond tender
years. Tots and toddlers simply cannot commit crimes or engage in other acts that
would cause them to be considered delinquent. While young children are rarely
subject to arrest, they are often the focus of abuse complaints.330 Patterning
dependency procedures on delinquency procedures would subject a significantly
larger number of children to summary seizure.
Third, as an adjunct to criminal law, delinquency is largely defined-and
limited-by the requirements of free will. These requirements, often understood
The courts that have accorded absolute immunity to social workers appear to have
overlooked the necessary historical inquiry; none has seriously considered whether social
workers enjoyed absolute immunity for their official duties in 1871. If they did not,
absolute immunity is unavailable to social workers under § 1983. This all assumes, of
course, that "social workers" (at least as we now understand the term) even existed in
1871.
Id. (citations omitted).
328 If anything, the historical record teaches that states' asserted parens patriae interests in
children must be carefully considered. For generations, states claimed a parens patriae interest
in removing poor children from their homes. Other than being institutionalized or sold into what
was the equivalent of slavery, most of these children were not "protected" in any way. What the
Court said in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1976)--"Juvenile Court history has again
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor
substitute for principle and procedure"-holds as true for America's treatment of dependent
children as it does for delinquent children. Benevolent theories do not always translate into
beneficent results. Id. Worse yet, the underlying theory itself may be flawed, as was certainly
the case in the context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century poor laws.
329 Because states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries equated delinquency with
crime, children were commonly taken from their homes without warrants. This continued into
the first half of the twentieth century, even as states' concerns began to shift toward child safety.
Children were simply not afforded many (if any) constitutional rights. This changed somewhat
with the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1967) (holding that juvenile
delinquents are entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause). Following Gault, children
could be arrested and detained outside the home without warrants (consistent with Watson and
Payton). See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 253 (1984) (holding that a juvenile may be
detained when an adult could be detained under similar circumstances). Many states began to
impose court order requirements in dependency situations. See, e.g., MODEL ACT OF 1968
(discussed supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text). Delinquency and dependency properly
began to diverge at this juncture in American history.
330 Id. at 13. One of the Doe children, for example, was six years old. See supra notes 99-
100 and accompanying text. The child removed in Tenenbaum was five. Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1989). The children removed in Wallis were two and five.
Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000).
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as voluntary conduct coupled with mens rea (scienter),331 result in not only a
smaller universe of potential delinquents, they also reduce the risk of erroneous
decisions. The outward expressions of free will demanded by delinquency laws
reduce the risk of erroneous arrests. 332
Dependency laws, in contrast, uniformly rely on ambiguous criteria, like
"abuse" and "neglect," without providing true guidance to social workers and
welfare agencies. Howard Davidson, director of the American Bar Association's
Center on Children and the Law, has lamented that "[a] single incident of a child
seemingly left unattended by parental or adult supervision, or where, in an instant,
a parent has 'lost their cool' and hit their child, are frequent bases for making
reports that cause full-scale ... investigations." 333 "By far," Davidson has noted,
"the majority of reports of child maltreatment do not allege that children are in
serious and imminent danger ... ,,334 Thus, "it is time to seriously consider
changes in the fundamental ways in which child abuse and neglect are defined
and responded to." 335
This theme is echoed by Professor Harold Richman, who serves as the
Director of the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the University of Chicago.
Professor Richman has offered that the basic definition of child abuse has "greatly
expanded" in the years following the American Academy of Pediatrics' first
conference on battered children.336 "There are four major types of child
maltreatment," according to Professor Richman: "physical abuse, sexual abuse,
emotional maltreatment, and neglect. '337 "Neglect is far and away the most
common form of child maltreatment and, of course, it is a particularly difficult
state to define in absolute terms. If we combine this with emotional maltreatment,
another slippery slope, we account for almost 60% of all maltreatment. '338
Emotional maltreatment, in particular, is a "difficult concept to capture. '339 Dr.
Richman found that most reported child abuse cases fall into a "troublesome"
gray area, one that has caused "a long and continuing struggle to differentiate
331 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. ScoTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 193 (2d
ed. 1986).
332 See id. at 197 ("One [reason] is that a person's thoughts are not susceptible of proof
except when demonstrated by outward actions.").
333 Davidson, supra note 13, at 774.
334 Davidson, supra note 13, at 774.
335 Davidson, supra note 13, at 774.
336 Richman, supra note 65, at 221.
337 Richman, supra note 65, at 221.
338 Richman, supra note 65, at 221.
339 Richman, supra note 65, at 221.
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between willful neglect ... and the consequences of involuntary poverty and
deprivation .... "340
As demonstrated by Florida's experiment,341 mandatory reporting laws-
which "frequently started with emergency-room physicians, expanded to include
all physicians and nurses, and went on to include teachers, social workers, and
others who work with children" 342-have compounded the problem. "What's
more, if these professionals failed to report any such case, they faced criminal
penalties. This greatly increased the bias toward reporting. Reporting was the
default: report and you're covered, even if you're wrong-never mind the costs,
both to the state and to the families wrongly accused." 343 Toll-free reporting
numbers "made reporting, well founded or not, appear to be not only the right
thing to do, but also easy." 344 Ambiguity and volume thus conspire to inflate the
risk of erroneous rescues and removals in the child welfare system. Delinquency,
in contrast, is better defined and more clearly manifested. While juvenile arrests
are sometimes wrong, their likelihood of error would appear significantly smaller
than the risk of needlessly rescuing children from capable parents.
Moreover, law enforcement personnel, who are generally charged with
enforcing delinquency laws, are better-trained than the social workers who
administer child welfare systems. "In most states, a bachelor's degree in any
subject is all that is required to become a public child protective service (CPS)
caseworker. After hiring, CPS pre-service training is too often minimal. Pay
scales are often very low, morale is frequently poor, and staff turnover is
340 Richman, supra note 65, at 221. Even with physical and sexual abuse, which make up
less than a third of the country's abuse cases, tremendous problems arise. Id. When does
parental action "cross[] from discipline to abuse"? Id. "The problem increased when sexual
abuse was added to the equation. When physical evidence of sexual abuse was absent or
ambiguous, could we know what had happened? ... Was it true that children never lied and
were never suggestible about such matters, or not?" Id. "[W]hen we move beyond evident,
serious physical injury, matters are less clear." Id. at 222.
341 See supra notes 49-92 and accompanying text.
342 Richman, supra note 65, at 222.
343 Richman, supra note 65, at 222. See also Chill, supra note 39, at 542 (reporting that
social workers, too, pursue removals in order to avoid discipline and criminal liability).
344 Richman, supra note 65, at 222. As a consequence, the number of child abuse reports
expanded from 60,000 in 1974 to over three million in 1997. Id. at 223. Professor Richman
blames this increase not only on ambiguous definitions, but also on sensational media coverage
and a steady increase in poverty. Id. Regardless of the precise causes, it appears that social
workers in many states today-like Florida-have almost as much discretion to remove
children as the churchwardens, overseers, and protection societies of generations past. Professor
Richman offers that a "substantial part [of the number of false accusations] surely comes from
the vague and inclusive definitions we operate under and the bias toward reporting we have
created." Id. See also Chill, supra note 39, at 541 (reporting that one-third of all rescued
children in America are not abused).
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constant."3 45 This certainly has proven true in Florida, where turnover rates have
remained high for years.346 Howard Davidson thus urges "much greater
legislative attention and funding ... to upgrade the CPS workforce." 34 7
Inadequate training and frequent turnover only exacerbate the welfare system's
risk of error.
For all these reasons, rescue is more of a gamble than might initially appear.
While I am not aware of data that proves or disproves this proposition, it appears
reasonable to believe that the likelihood of erroneous rescue is larger than the
likelihood of erroneous arrest. The modem child welfare system lacks the indicia
of reliability attached to criminal law enforcement. Unlike police forces,
caseworker turnover is constant. Training is minimal and morale low.
Caseworkers are routinely expected to apply vague standards to ambiguous facts.
In light of the uncertainty that is naturally attached to these problems, one could
easily conclude that greater procedural protections are needed. Post-deprivation
review may suffice for arrest, but not for rescue and removal.348
C. Civil Commitment
The Supreme Court has ruled, as a substantive matter, that adults can be
involuntarily committed when they are dangerous to themselves or others.349 The
Court has also held that civil commitment results in a deprivation of "liberty" 350
345 Davidson, supra note 13, at 772.
346 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
347 Davidson, supra note 13, at 773 ("all caseworkers should be legally required to attend
a pre-service academy similar to the intensive professional skills education that police,
firefighter, and emergency medical technician trainees typically receive").
348 Immediate detention not only acts as punishment for the wrongdoer; it offers
protection for society. Just as juveniles who outwardly exhibit anti-social traits are in need of
correction, society needs to be protected from future wrongs. Immediate detention efficiently
serves both ends. Dependent children, in contrast, need no correction. Nor does society need to
be protected from them. Immediate removal serves neither of these goals. Instead, removal is
designed to protect dependent children from their parents. Because dependency's objective is
strikingly different, it is not illogical to employ different means to achieve its goal. As
demonstrated below, immediate removal can harm children as much as it helps them. It is thus
not an efficient way of protecting children.
34 9 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that civil commitment
must be predicated on a finding of future dangerousness).
350 See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (observing that civil commitment is
a "massive curtailment of liberty"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (concluding
that civil commitment is subject to due process constraints); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-
94 (1980) (concluding that involuntary commitment of an inmate implicated procedural due
process).
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for purposes of procedural due process.351 The Court has yet to define, however,
the precise procedures for temporary, involuntary civil commitment. Must
warrants generally be obtained in the absence of exigent circumstances? Can
adults (or children) be temporally committed based solely on probable cause?
Civil commitment's history differs from that of rescue and removal.
Blackstone, of course, recognized that poor children could be removed from their
homes and impressed into the service of others.352 Substantive and procedural
protections for the poor were unheard of in colonial America.353 In contrast,
"[t]he common law had little need to concem itself with questions of adequate
procedure for involuntary confinement because public institutions for the
mentally ill were virtually nonexistent. '354 The first mental hospital in America
was not founded until 1751, and even one hundred years later, few mental
institutions existed. 355 It was not until 1788 that New York passed a law that
authorized the involuntary commitment of those "furiously madd [sic]," 356 and
then-consistent with the caution of the day-only upon the issuance of a
warrant. 357
By the middle of the nineteenth century, these strict procedural and
substantive standards for involuntary commitment began to change. More relaxed
standards allowed "dangerous" persons to be restrained indefinitely.358 Until the
latter half of the twentieth century, involuntary civil commitment was informal,
with little judicial oversight and protection. 359 It was not until the late-1960s that
civil commitment began shifting back to a more structured model.
The impetus for this shift appears to have been In re Gault,3 6 0 which
extended basic due process protections to juvenile delinquency proceedings in
1967.361 If civil delinquency proceedings are controlled by due process, courts
351 FRED COHEN, THE LAW OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 339
(1991) ("Civil commitment per se is so obviously a loss of liberty in its most pristine form that
there can be no question about the applicability of procedural due process ...
352 See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
353 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
354 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIEs 305 (Christian ed. 1827)), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
355 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1084-85.
356 Id. at 1085.
357 Id. (citing 1788 N.Y. Laws ch. 31).
358 See, e.g., In re Josiah Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845), available at
http://www.disabilitymuseum.org/lib/docs/1305.htm (concluding that the detention of a man
who became engaged to a younger woman shortly following the death of his wife was proper).
359 Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085-86.
360 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (holding that juvenile delinquents are entitled to
protections of the Due Process Clause).
361 See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
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began to ask, then why not civil commitment? 362 By the mid-1970s, when the
Supreme Court began developing substantive standards for commitment, 363 it
became clear that the Constitution's procedural protections must in some way
prove relevant.364 In Lessard v. Schmidt,365 for example, a three-judge federal
district court ruled in 1972 that while summary commitments are constitutionally
proper in emergencies, prompt post-deprivation process is required.366 Lessard
did not go so far as to hold that judicial authorization is generally required before
civil commitment. Its holding, however, reflects an important attitudinal change
among federal judges. No longer would governmental officials have carte blanche
to commit adults.
Notwithstanding this shift to more formal process, civil commitment still
continued to trail criminal detention in terms of procedural protections. In Project
Release v. Prevost,367 for example, which upheld a New York commitment
procedure that diverged sharply from the arrest and detention standards spelled
out in Gerstein v. Pugh,368 the Second Circuit rejected any "notion ... that civil
commitment is tantamount to incarceration for criminal conduct."369
Although civil commitment and criminal arrest have remained
constitutionally distinct throughout most of our Nation's history, their procedural
differences were recently blurred by the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in
Zinernon v. Burch.370 Zinermon was a § 1983 action on behalf of a plaintiff
(Burch) who ostensibly voluntarily signed himself into a mental health facility in
362 See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972); see also Doe
v. Gallinot, 486 F. Supp. 983, 994 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that a probable cause hearing must
be held within seven days of commitment); Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (E.D.
Ark. 1978) (requiring that a probable cause determination be made within seventy-two hours);
Kendell v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 419 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (requiring a probable cause hearing
for commitment).
363 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), for example, the Court ruled
that commitment must be predicated on future dangerousness.
364 In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), the Court ruled that clear and
convincing evidence is required for involuntary commitment.
365 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473
(1974).
366Id. at 1093 (en banc). The Wisconsin law at issue in Lessard authorized post-
deprivation delays totaling 145 days and thus was declared unconstitutional. Id.
367 Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that civilly
committed individuals are not entitled to same protections as arrested criminal suspects).
368 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that those arrested without
warrants are subject to prompt post-arrest judicial review).
369 Project Release, 772 F.2d at 974.
370 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 135 (1989) (holding that civil commitment is not a
"random and unauthorized" act dispensing with need for pre-deprivation process).
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Florida,371 where he was to be confined for five months. Because he was clearly
incompetent and was not provided a hearing to assess either his competency or
his potential dangerousness, Burch claimed that his commitment violated
procedural due process.372
The defense responded that if Burch's claims were true, hospital staff
members violated Florida law by summarily admitting him.3 73 Because their
actions were thus "random and unauthorized" within the meaning of Parratt v.
Taylor374 and Hudson v. Palmer,375 they could not have been preceded by
process. Burch's ability to pursue tort remedies against the offending parties, they
claimed, satisfied the demands of Parratt, Hudson, and procedural due
process.376 The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that prior process was possible
in Burch's case even if state law had been violated.377 Prior process, moreover,
was potentially valuable-that is, it may have prevented Burch's comnmitment.378
Burch's post-commitment tort remedies thus did not relieve the defendants of
their general responsibilities under the Due Process Clause.
At first blush, Zinermon appears to strike a powerful blow in favor of the
argument for pre-commitment judicial process. The Court's result, however, is
easily overstated. The narrow issue presented in Zinermon was whether the
Parratt-Hudson exception defeated Burch's procedural due process claim.379 The
371 Burch signed himself into Apalachee Community Mental Health Services (ACMHS),
a private facility. The Eleventh Circuit in Zinermon assumed that the private hospital was a state
actor acting under color of law. See Burch v. Appalachee Community Mental Health Servs.,
Inc., 840 F.2d 797, 803 (11th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court did not address this particular
issue. The Eleventh Circuit has since ruled that private mental health facilities, though heavily
regulated and authorized to commit mental patients by state law, are not state actors subject to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1 1th Cir. 1992). See
also Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 196-97 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that a private
mental health facility was not a state actor when it committed a patient).
372 Zinennon, 494 U.S. at 115.
373 Burch apparently conceded this point. See id. at 117 n.3.
374 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1980) (holding that "random and unauthorized"
acts need not be preceded by prior process in order to satisfy procedural due process).
375 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that even intentional wrongs can
be "random and unauthorized" for purposes of Parratt).
376 Under the Parratt-Hudson doctrine, random and unauthorized deprivations need not
be preceded by prior process; post-deprivation process, such as a false imprisonment claim,
satisfies due process. See Brown, supra note 46, at 825-29. The Court in Zinermon extended
the Parratt-Hudson exception, which previously had been applied only to property interests, to
liberty. Zinermon v. Butch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1989).
377 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39.
378 Id. at 134.
379 Id. at 117.
[T]he question before us is a narrow one. We decide only whether the Parratt rule
necessarily means that Burch's complaint fails to allege any deprivation of due process,
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Court categorically refused to address "[t]he broader questions of what procedural
safeguards the Due Process Clause requires in the context of an admission to a
mental hospital .... -380 The Court in Zinermon thus did not decide whether civil
commitment is generally premised on prior judicial process. It simply ruled that
one obstacle to Burch's civil rights claim-the Parratt-Hudson exception-had
been overcome. 381 The Court left open the possibility that other policies might
justify postponing process.
Still, while it does not resolve the ultimate issue of whether prior process is
required, Zinermon's analysis suggests an answer. Parratt, the Court observed, is
a particular application of the Mathews v. Eldridge382 three-part balancing test.383
This test weighs the nature of the private right at stake, the government's interest
and (perhaps most importantly) the value of prior process in order to determine
whether hearings should be conducted before deprivations. 384 Turning to this last
concern, the Court in Zinermon concluded that prior process was not only
feasible, it was valuable.385 The Court lauded Florida's involuntary placement
process, which required prior judicial process in the absence of emergencies. 386
The logical suggestion is that no less should be expected when commitment is
premised on voluntary consent.
It is not my intent to parse the precise meaning of the Court's holding in
Zinermon. My interest lies in the Supreme Court's conclusion that prior process
can be valuable in the commitment context. If it helps avoid improper
commitment, should not prior process be invoked whenever feasible? Of course,
this approach has been rejected under the law of arrest, which (with the Fourth
Amendment's blessing) allows warrantless arrests outside the home. 387 Were
courts to read Zinermon to demand prior judicial process whenever feasible,
temporary civil commitment would prove more constitutionally constrained than
criminal arrest.
because he was constitutionally entitled to nothing more than what he received-an
opportunity to sue ... intort for his allegedly unlawful confinement.
Id. 380 Id.
381 Id. at 138-39
382 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (holding that termination of disability
benefits need not be preceded by process).
383 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129 (1989).
384 Id. at 127 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
385 Id. at 135.
386 Id. at 133-34.
387 See supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
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Lower courts have not embraced such a bold interpretation of Zinermon.388
Instead, lower courts commonly approve summary, temporary commitments-
whether inside or outside the home. Civil commitment thus remains less formal
than criminal arrest, Zinermon notwithstanding.
Why has Zinermon not had a larger impact? Why have the lower courts not
demanded court orders for temporary civil commitments? Part of the reason, it
seems, is that commitment is typically initiated under facts that closely approach
exigent circumstances.389 Involuntary commitment, after all, is constitutionally
predicated on "dangerousness," 390 which lies in close proximity to the emergency
rationale that excuses the need for warrants under the Fourth Amendment391 and
prior judicial process under the Due Process Clause. 392 Lower courts often
conclude that summary commitments are justified by exigent circumstances, thus
dispensing with any need to discuss whether warrants or court orders should have
been sought beforehand.
Katzman v. Khan offers an example. 393 There, a young man who was
discovered running wildly and menacingly through a building was immediately
taken into custody under New York's civil commitment statute.394 The court had
little difficulty concluding that his summary, warrantless seizure did not violate
3 88 See JOHN PARRY & F. PHILLIPS GILLIAM, HANDBOOK ON MENTAL DIsABILITY LAW
174 (2002) ("Emergency commitments usually are based on ... probable cause that, without
inpatient mental health treatment, proposed patients will pose a serious risk of immediate harm
to themselves or others.").
3 89 Id.
390 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that one may be
committed only if dangerous to himself or others).
391 For example, in McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., 77 F.3d 540, 546 (1st Cir.
1996) (discussed more filly infra notes 398-402 and accompanying text), police argued that
every involuntary commitment falls under the exigent circumstances exception. Commitment,
they argued, can only be justified by a "medical finding that the subject presently poses a
'likelihood of serious harm' to herself or others, which in turn provides the police with
reasonable cause to believe that an immediate, forcible" commitment is needed. McCabe, 77
F.3d at 546.
392 The Zinermon majority appeared to recognize that emergency circumstances can also
excuse prior process under the Due Process Clause. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 122
(1989) (describing Florida's involuntary commitment procedure which it later used as a model
for voluntary commitment). Lower courts have uniformly agreed that exigent circumstances
excuse any need for prior process. See, e.g., Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir.
2003) (holding that lack of exigent circumstances in context of warrantless rescue from child's
home results in Fourteenth Amendment violation).
393 Katizman v. Khan, 67 F. Supp. 2d 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), aftid, 242 F.3d 365 (2d Cir.
2000).
394 Id. at 107.
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the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. Exigent circumstances clearly existed,
and the seizure was consequently valid under any constitutional standard. 395
Katzman illustrates the reality of civil commitment. Quite often, true exigent
circumstances exist regardless of whether commitment originates inside or
outside the home. This is due, in part, to the substantive constitutional predicate
for commitment; a person must be an immediate danger to himself or others. 396
Unlike child abuse laws, which include past harm as well as risks of future harm,
the civil commitment process is largely tied to the future. Facts that satisfy this
predictive standard often satisfy the exigent circumstances exception, which
similarly focuses on what might happen in the future. Quite distinct from child
abuse investigations, the civil commitment process rarely affords government
officials time to seek prior judicial authorization.397
In those rare cases where exigent circumstances do not plausibly exist, lower
courts have tended to fashion exceptions tailored specifically to civil
commitment. For instance, in McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Service, police
summarily broke down the door of a home occupied by a disoriented, elderly
woman (Zinger) in order to commit her. 398 During the course of the police raid,
which the district court found had proceeded "with leisure,"399 Zinger died of
cardiac arrest.40 0 Her estate claimed that, because sufficient time existed to seek
prior judicial authorization, the police violated Zinger's Fourth Amendment
rights. 4 0 1 The First Circuit, applying the Fourth Amendment's "special needs"
doctrine, concluded that in the context of civil commitment police can forcibly
enter homes without warrants.402 Specific exigent circumstances are not required.
The seizure in McCabe, of course, occurred inside the home. Because a
criminal arrest under similar circumstances would have violated the Fourth
391 Id. at 109-10.
396 See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
397 For instance, in Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995), the
Second Circuit read New York law to allow summary commitment
only if a staff physician of the hospital upon examination of such person finds that such
person [has] a mental illness for which immediate observation, care, and treatment in a
hospital is appropriate ... that the patients alleged mental illness be 'likely to result in
serious harm to himself or others .... '[l]ikely to result in serious harm to himself,' as used
in [New York law], means posing a [substantial risk of physical harm to himself as
manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct
demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself.]
Given this narrow interpretation, New York's law, which authorizes warrantless removals from
the home, was found to satisfy due process. Id.
398 McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., 77 F.3d 540 (1st Cir. 1996).
399 Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted).
400 Id. at 542.
401 Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted).
402 Id. at 544-45.
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Amendment, the First Circuit was forced-assuming the Fourth Amendment's
relevance 403-to look for an exception. Seizures and arrests outside the home,
however, do not require warrants under the Fourth Amendment.40 4 Under these
circumstances, courts have often employed Fourth Amendment arrest standards
to uphold summary civil commitments. Villanova v. Abrams provides perhaps the
best example.405  There, Judge Posner analyzed civil commitment in
"straightforward" Fourth Amendment terms:
A civil commitment is a seizure, and may be made only upon probable cause,
that is, only if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is
subject to seizure .... There is no requirement of a warrant issued by a judicial
officer.... [A]n arrest warrant is required only when a person is to be arrested in
his home.406
In sum, lower courts have tended to sustain summary commitments under
any and all circumstances. Where seizure takes place outside the home, they often
analogize to the law of criminal arrest. When commitment occurs inside the
home, courts either find exigent circumstances or create a "special needs"
exception. The "most litigated" question in the context of commitment,
consequently, is not whether a hearing should have been held beforehand, but
how long the institutionalized patient must wait before a hearing is held.
40 7
I find it surprising that Zinermon's due process discussion has not had a
greater impact on civil commitment. Zinermon, after all, was premised on what
the Court perceived to be a general availability of pre-commitment procedures.
Unless Zinermon was intended to cover only "long-term" as opposed to
"temporary" commitments--a plausible but (it seems to me) ultimately flawed
interpretation 4 8-its language and holding would certainly seem relevant.
Indeed, Zinermon offers a good argument for generally demanding pre-
commitment process when feasible.
403 Courts today tend to agree that the Fourth Amendment is relevant to civil removals
and commitments, as well as criminal arrests. See, e.g., McCabe, 77 F.3d at 545. See also supra
notes 286-92 and accompanying text (describing application of both Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to rescues of children).
404 See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
405 Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1992).
406 Id. at 795.
407 PARRY & GILLIAM, supra note 388, at 175.
408 A full expos6 on the meaning of Zinermon is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
excellent discussion of Zinermon, the reader is encouraged to peruse Laura Oren, Signing into
Heaven: Zinermon v. Burch, Federal Rights, and State Remedies Thirty Years After Monroe v.
Pape, 40 EMORY L.J. 1 (1991).
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Even conceding that adults can be committed without prior process,409 this
should not be understood to mean that children can be summarily removed from
their homes and families. Children are different. The policies that justify the
immediate commitment of adults do not necessarily apply to the rescue of
children. First, adults--even those suspected of mental illness-are generally
better able to care for themselves than are children. Many mentally disabled
adults can exist without caregivers and other forms of patemal/matemal
assistance. Children, especially those of tender years, need care and almost-
constant companionship. The removal of a child from his natural environment can
be far more damaging than the commitment or arrest of an adult.
Second, one should not forget the impact rescue has on parents. A common
assumption is that suspected abusers "get what they deserve." Who cares if these
parents suffer late-night knocks on their doors from unknown social workers who
intend to snatch their children? This attitude reflects an unfortunate rush to
judgment. As made clear below, many suspected parents are perfectly
innocent.4 10 The pain inflicted on innocent parents when children are wrongly
removed greatly exceeds the harm caused by wrongful arrests and commitments
of adults. 411
Third, as discussed in detail below, modem definitions of child abuse tend to
be fluffy and vague.412 Unlike criminal statutes, abuse laws are not written
succinctly. And unlike the Supreme Court's singular standard for civil
commitment---"dangerous to himself or others"4 3-abuse laws target a wide
array of "bad parenting."414 It is no exaggeration to say that abuse laws are
generally open to interpretation. Coupled with political pressures fed by
horrendous headlines and a natural desire to protect children,415 the child abuse
system's net can be cast far and wide.
Fourth, unlike civil commitment, removal carries with it a large measure of
moral approbation. The message to parents--"you've done something terribly
wrong"-is often broadcast to the community. When someone is committed, by
contrast, the communal reaction tends to be one of concern, not outrage.
For all these reasons, the rules surrounding civil commitment should not be
borrowed wholesale for the law of rescue and removal. Abuse is different.
4 09 See PARRY & GILLAM, supra note 388.
4 10 See infra notes 500-04 and accompanying text.
411 See infra notes 500-05 and accompanying text.
412 See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
413 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
4 14 See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
415 See Chill, supra note 39, at 542 ("Defensive social work has flourished in the past 20
years, fueled by the news media's appetite for sensational child maltreatment stories as well as
by laws that purposely magnify the public visibility of child maltreatment fatalities and near
fatalities.") (citations omitted). See also supra notes 341-44 and accompanying text.
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Children are different. Rescue is different. Borrowing from the histories, policies,
and constitutional comparisons explored above, the next Part attempts to fashion
what the procedural world of rescue ought to look like.
V. BRINGING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO BEAR
I have devoted much of this Article to explaining differences between arrest,
removal, and commitment. My point is that because the three differ (in terms of
history, justifications, and surrounding policies), they each can logically generate
unique procedural requirements.
My focus now shifts to what those procedural requirements ought to be in the
context of rescue and removal. Borrowing from general Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment standards, I argue that rescue should be preceded by some sort of
judicial proceeding. Removal is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
and is a deprivation of liberty under the Due Process Clause. Both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments generally prefer process before adverse governmental
action. Both also recognize that "exigent circumstances" 4 16 are needed to excuse
prior process. In the absence of categorical, exceptional needs-which I argue
below do not exist under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments-these
general standards ought to be employed in the context of removal.
A. Do "Special Needs "Justify Downward Departure?
Part IV.B argues both that the Fourth Amendment should be applied to
rescues and that its requirements can logically diverge from those applied to
arrests. 4 17 In sum, the suggestion is that the Fourth Amendment can properly
require more for rescues and removals than for arrests; in particular, that rescues
might be subjected to an across-the-board warrant requirement, even though
procedures for arrest diverge at the threshold of the home.
If rescue differs from arrest in a meaningful way, as argued above, could it be
that the procedures for rescues should be less demanding than those for arrests?
Might it be constitutionally permissible (and normatively wise) to simply allow
summary rescues in all cases, with judicial review to follow? The Supreme Court
has recognized for some time that the Fourth Amendment's requirements can be
waived or modified in "administrative" cases. In Camara v. Municipal Court,4 18
4 16 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (describing exigent circumstances
exception to Fourth Amendment); United States v. James David Good Real Property, 510 U.S.
43 (1993) (discussing exigent circumstances exception to Due Process Clause).
417 See supra notes 286-348 and accompanying text.
418 Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (holding that diminished probable
cause standard applies to safety inspections). The Camara Court continued to require warrants
for safety inspections. Warrants, however, could be readily obtained under the diminished
probable cause standard that was required.
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for example, the Court ruled that safety inspections could proceed under a
diminished probable cause standard.419 Subsequent cases extended Camara's
rationale and dispensed with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in the
context of "closely regulated" businesses and industries.420 Thus, in New York v.
Burger, the Court ruled that an automotive junkyard was subject to warrantless
inspections by police.421
The Supreme Court's so-called "administrative exception" quickly spilled
outside the banks of safety inspections. From metal detectors and x-ray machines
used at airports422 to drunk-driver checkpoints employed during holiday
seasons, 423 the administrative exception became a common justification for
suspicionless and warrantless searches. Warrantless searches of families, homes,
and children, in particular, have been upheld under this exception. In Wyman v.
James, for example, the Court ruled that welfare recipients could be required to
submit to warrantless home visits by social workers.424 In Griffin v. Wisconsin,
the Court ruled that a probationer's home could be searched without a warrant.425
And in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court concluded that high school students were
subject to warrantless searches based on evidence that did not amount to probable
cause.
426
In a concurring opinion in TL.O.,42 7 Justice Blackmun first coined the term
"special needs," which has since displaced the use of the dated and less-
419 Camara, which involved houses, was applied to businesses in See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) (holding that the fire inspection of a business was subject to same
diminished probable cause standard).
420 The Court in Colonnade Catering v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970), and
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972), held that liquor and firearms businesses,
respectively, being heavily regulated, were not governed by Camara's warrant requirement. See
also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981) (holding that mine inspectors can search
without warrant). Contra Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (holding that
businesses that are not closely regulated are protected by warrant requirement).
421 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703--04 (1987) (holding that auto junkyard was
subject to warrantless inspection).
422 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, at 240-41 (discussing constitutionality of screening
devices at airports).
423 See LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 18, at 238-40 (discussing validity of vehicle
checkpoints).
424 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) (holding welfare recipients can be
subjected to warrantless visits or forfeit benefits).
425 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (holding probationer's home is subject
to warrantless search).
426 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (holding student was subject to search
without probable cause).
427 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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informative "administrative exception." 428 The "special needs" terminology was
adopted by a majority of Justices two years later,429 and since that time the Court
has routinely observed that, "in limited circumstances, a search unsupported by
either warrant or probable cause can be constitutional when 'special needs' other
than the normal need for law enforcement provide sufficient justification."430
Like the old administrative exception, the "special needs" analysis basically
weighs the respective interests of the government and the individual.431 Where
the governmental interest is "divorced from the State's general interest in law
enforcement" 432 and not easily accommodated using the Fourth Amendment's
general terms,433 the warrant requirement can be dispensed with. Indeed, the
government's special needs can justify dispensing with probable cause and even
reasonable suspicion.434
Drug testing provides a useful illustration of how the Court employs the
special needs balancing test. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the members of train crews,435 federal Customs agents,436 and high school
students437 can be subject to mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis so long as test
428 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (noting that the "term
'special needs' first appeared in Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.") (citation omitted).
429 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (adopting "special needs"
terminology and upholding warrantless search of probationer's home). See Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75 n.7 (2001) (noting that the term "special needs" was adopted by a
majority in Griffin).
430 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 75 n.7 (2001).
431 Id. at 78 (observing that the "special needs" test "weighed the intrusion on the
individual's interest in privacy against the 'special needs' that supported the program").
432 Id. at 79 (citation omitted).
433 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(observing that special needs must render the "warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable").
434 See, e.g., infra notes 435-51. Contra Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997)
(striking down requirement that candidates for office undergo suspicionless drug testing).
435 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (holding that,
following accidents, train crews can be required to undergo urinalysis even without reasonable
suspicion).
436 See Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding that
Customs workers seeking promotions to sensitive positions can be forced to submit to
suspicionless urinalysis).
437 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (holding that high school
students participating in interscholastic sports can be subjected to suspicionless drug tests); Bd.
of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002)
(holding that requiring all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities to
submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the school district's important
interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren).
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results are not intended for criminal law enforcement. In Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,438 which
upheld suspicionless drug testing of all high school students involved in
competitive extracurricular activities, the Court emphasized that the testing
program was "not in any way related to the conduct of criminal investigations
... ."439 The test results were "not turned over to any law enforcement authority,"
nor would they "lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic
consequences." 440 The school district's concern was "detecting and .preventing
drug use among its students,"'441 rather than punishing them.
Weighed against the school district's "important," 442 non-punitive rationale
were the students' twin interests in privacy and confidentiality.443 While the latter
was largely insured by the limited scope of test results' use-they could not be
accessed by law enforcement officials and were kept from the prying eyes of
others-the former was preserved by relatively discrete collection techniques.
Monitors did not observe tests;"4 they simply waited outside the "closed
restroom stall for the student to produce a sample and [to] 'listen for the normal
sounds of urination .... "445 Because high school children are "routinely required
to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease,"44 6 and
voluntarily agree to diverse invasions in order to participate in after-school
programs,44 7 any residual compromise of their privacy concerns was deemed
"negligible" by the Court.448 The only remaining issue was whether suspicionless
urinalysis was a "reasonably effective" tool for "deterring[] and detecting drug
use." 449 Finding that suspicionless testing furthers both ends, the Court
"question[ed] whether testing based on individualized suspicion... would be less
intrusive." 450 "Such a regime... of individualized suspicion might unfairly target
members of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted
438 Earls, 536 U.S. at 822, 838 (holding that high school students engaged in
extracurricular activities can be required to undergo mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis).
439 Id. at 829.
440 Id. at 833.
441 Id. at 825.
442/d.
443 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 848 (2002).
444 Id. at 832.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 830-31.
447Id. at 831.
4481 d at 833.
449 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 837 (2002).
450 Id.
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searches may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in
combating drug use."451
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, decided the previous Term, stands in stark
contrast to Earls and the cases it represents.452 Ferguson addressed a public
hospital's use of drug testing to deter pregnant women from using illegal
drugs.453 Urine screens were performed on maternity patients who were thought
to be using cocaine. Positive tests were used to "leverage" patients into formal
treatment programs.454 Patients who refused, or who failed to live up to the
treatment program's terms, were referred to law enforcement officials for possible
prosecution.455 Potential charges included child neglect and unlawful delivery of
a controlled substance to a child.456
Because the hospital's urinalysis program was not "divorced from the State's
general interest in law enforcement," 457 but instead used "law enforcement to
coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment," 458 the Court concluded that it
did not qualify for treatment under the special needs exception. "[A]II the
available evidence" demonstrated that the hospital's "primary purpose" was
"indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control." 459 Local
"prosecutors and police were extensively involved in the day-to-day
administration of the policy."460 Police coordinated arrests with hospital staff.4 6 1
Even though the hospital's motives were otherwise "benign" 462 and addressed "a
serious problem," 463 the program's "pervasive involvement" with law
enforcement rendered it unqualified for the special needs exception.464 "[T]he
gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what
means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose." 465
451 Id.
452 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
453 Id. at 70.
454 Id. at 72.
455 Id. at 72-73.
456 Id.
457 Id. at 79.
458 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80 (2001).
459 Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
460 Id. at 82.
461 Id.
462 Id. at 85.
463 Id. at 86.
464 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001).
465 Id. at 86 (citation omitted).
2004]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL.
States that have abandoned warrants in the child abuse context-like
Florida-commonly argue the special needs exception.466 As in Earls, they claim
that warrants interfere with their important interests in protecting children.467 No
one, of course, contests the government's compelling concern over child abuse
and neglect. Nor can anyone argue about the fundamental rights of parents to care
for and protect their children.468 Given the weighty loads on both sides of the
scale, it is questionable whether any meaningful insight can be garnered through
simple, straight-up balancing. Answers are instead more likely to be found in the
character of child abuse investigations and effectiveness of warrantless rescues.
As demonstrated by Ferguson, the Court presumes that searches motivated
by law enforcement purposes should be governed by law enforcement standards,
which generally require some level of suspicion.469 Along these same lines, child
abuse investigations that further law enforcement aims should be subjected to
basic law enforcement standards; at least they should not be excused outright.470
The question then is whether child abuse investigations are designed to further the
objectives of law enforcement.
Unlike in Ferguson, where criminal prosecutions were used to leverage
treatment,47 1 child abuse investigations (and resulting rescues) proceed along a
more ambiguous path. Doe v. Kearney demonstrates that children can be rescued
without prosecutors later filing corresponding criminal charges against parents.472
Still, child abuse investigations are not divorced from law enforcement either.
Unlike the urinalysis program sustained under the special needs exception in
Earls,47 3 rescue is often entwined with law enforcement. Conclusions drawn from
child abuse investigations commonly form the bases for criminal charges. Even
when criminal charges are not filed, caseworker findings can make their way into
official law enforcement reports, like criminal rap sheets.474 Further insinuating
466 See, e.g., Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Utah's
argument that special needs justified its abandonment of the warrant requirement); Walsh v.
Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 751 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(rejecting Ohio social workers' claim that special needs justified abandonment of warrant
requirement).
467 Roska, 328 F.3d at 1241-42.
468 See supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
469 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67.
470 As argued below, child rescues should be judged under even more protective Fourth
Amendment standards. See infra notes 497-513 and accompanying text. My point here is that if
investigations and rescues are designed to further law enforcement ends, they should at least be
subjected to the same minimal standards.
471 See supra notes 452-65 and accompanying text.
472 See supra notes 93-130 and accompanying text.,
473 See supra notes 438-51 and accompanying text.
474 John Doe's Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) report, for example,
included DCF's unsubstantiated claim that he had abused a young boy in 1995. See Doe v.
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law enforcement into abuse investigations is the common practice of enlisting the
aid of police to facilitate rescues. The caseworker in Doe, for example, called and
waited for the assistance of Hillsborough County sheriffs before proceeding to the
Doe residence.475 This is an understandable practice, given the propensity of
parents to forcibly resist turning their childrefi over to strangers.476
Given that "[n]one of [the Court's] special needs precedents has sanctioned
the routine inclusion of law enforcement ... to implement the system designed
for the special needs objectives," 477 a strong argument can be made that child
abuse investigations (and rescues) simply do not qualify for special needs
treatment. The Tenth Circuit's rejection of the special needs exception in the
context of home rescues thus appears imminently reasonable. 478
Even assuming that rescues are sufficiently divorced from law enforcement
for purposes of the special needs exception, there is some question over the need
for warrantless rescues and their overall effectiveness. The Eleventh Circuit in
Doe v. Kearney identified several problems raised by the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement: first, prior process would impose "a new and onerous
burden on child welfare agencies, many of which already operate under
considerable strain;" 479 second, it would jeopardize child safety;480 and third, it
might discourage social workers from acting.481
Although similar arguments proved effective in Earls,482 which held that
suspicionless drug testing of high school students was justified by special needs,
Keamey, No. 8:00-CV-184-T-26B (transcript of hearing, held on June 18, 2001, 176-82) (on
file with author). The caseworker, O'Brien, then relied on this unsubstantiated allegation to
support her conclusion that Doe had a history of molesting children. See supra notes 100-14
and accompanying text.
475 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
476 Several counties' sheriffs' offices in Florida, moreover, have been granted the power
to perform DCF's investigative functions, exclusive of DCF's interference. See Fla. Stat. ch.
39.3065(1) & (3) (mandating that DCF transfer investigative authority to several counties'
sheriffs' departments). The special needs exception would appear particularly inapplicable in
situations where police directly administer the program.
477 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 88 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
478 See Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that warrantless
rescue of child from home cannot be justified using special needs exception). See also Walsh v.
Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 751 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(holding that warrantless search of home for signs of child abuse cannot be justified by special
needs exception).
479 Doe v. Keamey, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2003).
480 Id. at 1293 ("[T]he State has a profound interest in the welfare of the child.").
481 Id. at 1297 ("In terms of litigation, individual liability and damages, an error on the
side of removal is risky, while an error on the other side is safe.") (quoting Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 611 (2d Cir. 1999) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)).
482 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 829 (2002). The Supreme Court in Earls was obviously concerned about the welfare of
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they are not as appealing in the context of rescue. The last of these alleged special
needs-overdeterrence-is a constant in constitutional litigation, one that to a
large degree is mitigated by the availability of qualified immunity. 483 Still, it
came to the forefront in Earls because of the large measure of discretion afforded
government officials by the "reasonable suspicion" standard. Forced to choose
between suspicionless and suspicion-based standards, the Court in Earls
understandably wondered whether the latter might cause more mischief than
good.484 Armed with discretion, the Court observed, government officials might
target unpopular groups.485 This would inevitably lead to litigation, which could
in the end "chill enforcement." 486
In contrast to the choice presented in Earls, the choice put to caseworkers is
between prior judicial authorization and summary action. While demanding prior
judicial authorization will discourage caseworkers from rescuing some children-
indeed, that is one of prior process's values-it also supplies abuse investigators
with an almost-absolute shield from liability.487 This shield ought to ameliorate
the problem of overdeterrence. Only when they act without prior judicial
protection are investigators at risk. Armed with warrants, investigators should
prove optimally emboldened and encouraged to act.
Of all the justifications set out by the Eleventh Circuit in Doe, the most
credible is that requiring warrants could strain child welfare systems with "new
and onerous" burdens. 488 Were this to happen, child safety could be jeopardized,
which would in turn give credence to the need for an exception. The problem with
the charge, however, is that a large number of states continue to successfully
operate under systems requiring prior judicial authorization. 489 Indeed, Florida
required court orders for over twenty years. 490 Prior process is hardly a novel
concept. Given the dearth of evidence suggesting that prior process is generally
high school students in light of the national problem with illicit drugs. See id. at 834 ("[T]he
nationwide drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school."). It
also expressed its concern with overdeterrence: "A program of individualized suspicion might
unfairly target members of unpopular groups. The fear of lawsuits resulting from such targeted
searches may chill enforcement of the program, rendering it ineffective in combating drug use."
Id. at 837.
483 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82, 85 (1989).
484 Earls, 536 U.S. at 841-42.
485 Earls, 536 U.S. at 837.
486 Id.
487 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) (holding that police who execute
warrants are generally entitled to immunity).
488 Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2003).
489 See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
490 See supra note 52-64 and accompanying text.
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impractical in the child abuse context,491 or that warrants cause debilitating delays
and exacerbate injuries, it would seem that the "onerous burden" argument is
speculative and exaggerated. 492
The ultimate issue, of course, is how to best protect children. Although
summary rescue offers one approach, I am not convinced it is any more effective
than generally conditioning rescues on warrants. Granted, summary rescue enjoys
the advantage of volume. This advantage, however, is also a curse. It translates
into more mistakes, which, in turn, result in more children being needlessly
placed in foster care.493 Citing a lack of the "stable, nurturing care they need,"494
as well as "a much greater risk of maltreatment than are children in the population
at large,495 one commentator has concluded that "it can no longer be presumed
that removal of a poor child from a home necessarily serves the state's avowed
interests in child protection."496 Unlike the threat of random urinalysis, which
generally deters illicit drug use, it is by no means plain that the twin threats of
summary rescue and foster care encourage better parenting.
B. Does Rescue Require More?
The previous section argued that special needs do not justify dispensing with
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Rejection of the special needs
doctrine, however, does nothing more than establish that rescues are subject to the
general processes of the Fourth Amendment. While this means that a child's
rescue from his home must be judicially authorized, it does not necessarily mean
that rescues initiated outside the home must be similarly approved. Arrests
outside the home, after all, need not be accompanied by warrants, even when time
491 Telephonic warrants, after all, are available in many states, including Florida. See, e.g.,
Kalmanson v. Lockett, 848 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("It is not unusual,
however, for trial court judges to be contacted by telephone by law enforcement officials
seeking, for example, consideration of an emergency search or arrest warrant or a temporary
injunction to prevent domestic violence.").
492 Children, moreover, can be summarily rescued notwithstanding a general warrant
requirement. Faced with exigent circumstances, caseworkers need not await prior judicial
approval. The warrant process will often only shift a social worker's attention from bureaucracy
to the judiciary. In Doe, for example, the social worker could have devoted the three-plus hours
she used clearing the matter with DCF attomeys and waiting for deputy sheriffs to phoning a
judge. See supra notes 93-114, 491. The only real difference is that sometimes warrants will
not be forthcoming. But that is the very reason for warrants.
493 See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
494 Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for Children
When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 413,462 (2003).
491 Id. at 463.
496 Id. at 468-69. "[E]xisting evidence supports the conclusion that foster care, at least as
it currently exists and operates, often is quite harmful to children and, generally, may have more
harmful consequences for children than leaving the child in the home." Id. at 469-70.
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would easily accommodate the application process. 497 Should rescue be treated
differently? Should rescue generally demand prior judicial authorization
regardless of location?
Without recounting removal's checkered past, it is sufficient at the outset to
note that rescue's pedigree instills little implicit trust. Children were removed
because of poverty long before they were rescued because of abuse.498 Indeed,
some still complain about the welfare/protection system's class-based bias.49 9
History, more than anything else, teaches that governmental meddling with
families ought to be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.
More importantly, the child abuse system today experiences a significant
error rate. Vague standards,500 large turnover,501 poor training,502 and
overzealous reporting requirements conspire to cause needless rescues. Professor
Richman, a noted expert on child abuse, has observed that the "most startling fact
about child-abuse reporting numbers, beyond their size, is that most of the reports
remain unsubstantiated-that is, they are not substantiated after caseworker
investigation." 503 On average, "60% to 65% of [the] cases [are] not
substantiated.' 50 4
Even assuming that no physical rescue or ultimate removal takes place,
summary investigations risk unintended, adverse consequences.
497 See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
498 See supra notes 179-222 and accompanying text.
499 See, e.g., Kindred, supra note 494, at 491 (observing that "poverty is a common
characteristic of families charged with maltreatment, particularly neglect, and removal is a
common response of child protective agencies").
500 See supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text.
501 See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
502 See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
503 Richman, supra note 65, at 223.
504 Richman, supra note 65, at 223. Professor Richman points to Illinois as an example,
where "one-half of the reports were not substantiated in 1985; by 1989 the proportion had risen
to 63%, and in 1997 it was 65%. These last two figures are essentially the same as the estimates
of the national average, where we consistently have 60% to 65% of cases not substantiated." Id.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families
corroborates Professor Richman's findings. Of the almost 275,000 children removed from their
homes in 2001, more than 100,000-fully one-third-were found to be "non-victims." See U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services Factsheets/Publications,
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm01/table6_5.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2004). See also Chill, supra note 39, at 541. If removal is wrong one-third of the time,
emergency rescue surely experiences a larger rate of error.
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Can you imagine the impact on familial relationships, on the family's view of
itself, and on the view of the family held by those consulted in the investigation?
We cannot be right 100% of the time in such matters, but when we are right only
33% of the time, the situation may be as damaging, or more damaging, than the
problem.505
Further, the risk of removal may lead parents to avoid needed assistance. How
many parents forego trips to doctors and hospitals because they fear removal?
All of this assumes, of course, that judges' ex ante review mitigates these
concerns by reducing the overall risk of error and minimizing the number of
removals. Common sense suggests that it does. Consider Florida, where judges ex
post have tended to ratify more than ninety-seven percent of governmental
rescues. 50 6 This fait accompli phenomenon can only be understood as a judicial
hesitance to upset the status quo. Faced with rescues that have already taken
place, moreover, judges would rather err on the side of extreme caution. In an ex
post setting, these tendencies reinforce one another. The result is uniform
acceptance of rescues by the judiciary. These same judicial tendencies, however,
will likely tug against one another when review is had ex ante.50 7 Judges' natural
inclination to err in favor of rescue will be offset by their unwillingness to upset
the status quo, parental custody. Simply put, judges are less likely to act like
rubber stamps when doing so will cause a child's immediate removal from its
family.
Further, as observed by Professor William Stuntz, the warrant process deters
executive officials from pursuing marginal cases, which can prevent bad searches
and seizures and thereby reduce the system's relative risk of error.50 8 Even if
judges grant warrants and ratify rescues at identical rates, requiring warrants in
the first place ought to reduce the number of errors.509 This self-policing feature
of the warrant requirement pays added dividends in states, like Florida, that offer
few (if any) post-rescue remedies. 5 10 When executive officials know that their
505 Richman, supra note 65, at 223.
50 6 See supra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
507 See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 915 (observing a common judicial bias in the context of
ex post review of searches and seizures); Chill, supra note 39, at 543-45 (describing judicial
bias against returning children to parents).
508 Stuntz, supra note 40, at 891 (observing that the warrant process "forces police
officers to go to some substantial trouble before engaging in searches (thereby encouraging
them not to do so without good reason)").
509 Stuntz, supra note 40, at 891.
510 have noted elsewhere the difficulty of overcoming qualified immunity in the
Eleventh Circuit, where Florida is located. See Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under
§ 1983: Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1511 n.52,
1512 (1999). Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (1lth Cir. 2003), provides another obvious
example. The District Court in Doe concluded that the social worker, O'Brien, was entitled to
qualified immunity because she had "arguable probable cause" to believe the Doe children had
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likelihood of liability for obvious mistakes approaches zero, they have little
incentive to police themselves. It is in this atmosphere that warrants prove
particularly useful.51'
My assumption has been that there is little downside to the warrant
requirement. The volume of removal will decrease, which will likewise reduce
the number of erroneous rescues. I am not so naive as to believe that the tradeoff
is that simple. Reduced volume might also reduce the frequency of detected
abuse. The warrant process might not only screen out false positives, it might also
screen out true wrongs. Fortunately, the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement is not an absolute. Warrants are excused by exigent circumstances,
facts that make it difficult or impossible to timely obtain a warrant.512 A child
been abused. Notwithstanding that a state court had found no probable cause, it accordingly
granted judgment as a matter of law to the defense. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit went one
step further and concluded that O'Brien had actual probable cause to rescue the Doe children.
Not only did the court ignore the state court's conclusion to the contrary and go further than
even the District Court dared to go, it ignored settled principles of law and usurped the role of
the jury in order to protect O'Brien. It also concluded that the Does had consented to O'Brien's
entry of their home, even though the Does steadfastly denied that they had. When reviewing a
judgment as a matter of law, of course, the court is to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the losing party. The Eleventh Circuit, which notoriously defends and immunizes government
officials' abusive actions, went well beyond accepted bounds to insulate O'Brien. Contra
Walsh v. Erie County Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 748 (N.D. Ohio
2003) (rejecting social workers claim at summary judgment stage that parents had consented to
warrantless entry of their home in order to search for evidence of child abuse).
511 See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 909 ("warrants can serve as a useful, if partial, corrective
for the set of incentives problems that damages remedies engender").
512 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (holding that exigent
circumstances dispense with warrant requirement). The Court in Mincey refused to concede that
arrests for serious offenses inside the home are automatically justified by exigent
circumstances: "We decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself
creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a
warrantless search." Id. at 394. Instead, the Court concluded that time is the touchstone of
exigency. Exigent circumstances did not exist in Mincey because "[t]here was no indication that
evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search
warrant.... And there is no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and conveniently
have been obtained." Id. "Many lower courts utilize the list of 'considerations' set out in
Dorman [v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)]" to assess exigent circumstances.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, at 190. Judge Leventhal described seven considerations in
Dorman: First, whether a "grave offense" was involved; second, whether the suspect was
"reasonably believed to be armed;" third, whether "a clear showing of probable cause" existed;
fourth, whether a "strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises" existed; fifth, the
likelihood that the suspect would "escape if not swiftly apprehended;" sixth, whether the entry
could be made "peaceably;" and last, whether the entry was made at night. 435 F.2d at 392-93.
The Court has since ruled that warrantless arrests inside the home for relatively minor offenses
ordinarily cannot be justified by exigent circumstances. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
753 (1984) (holding that fresh pursuit exception did not apply to drunk driving).
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immediately in harm's way can be summarily rescued, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. While not a panacea, the Fourth Amendment's warrant/exigent
circumstances dichotomy seems to strike a sound compromise.
Viewed through this prism, distinguishing rescues that take place outside the
home from those that occur inside the home makes little sense. Rescue's error rate
would not seem to vary based on location. The harm caused to parents and
children, moreover, would appear to be constant. Granted, heightened privacy
interests inside the home render home invasions particularly egregious. Taking
children from their schools or playgrounds without their parents' knowledge,
however, can be even more traumatic. In the Doe case, for example, D.M.'s
parents were thrown into a panic when she did not return from school on time.513
In today's climate of kidnappings, molestations, and murders, inflicting
uncertainty of this sort on parents ought to be avoided whenever possible. While
warrants can not fully solve this problem, they should help minimize it.
C. Unraveling Due Process
The Fourth Amendment does not pose the only stumbling block to summary
rescues. Prior process is also preferred by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.514 Because parental rights are clearly "liberty," the argument is
that they can only be interrupted after some sort of hearing.515 Like the Fourth
Amendment, procedural due process admits exceptions. Process can be delayed,
and even modified, under the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,516
which weighs three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.517
Using variations on this test, the Supreme Court has concluded that common
law remedies (which follow wrongs) can satisfy procedural due process under
certain, unusual circumstances. 518 More often, the Court has found that statutorily
513 See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
514 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
515 See supra notes 256-85 and accompanying text.
516 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that disability hearing can be
postponed until after termination of benefits).
517Id. at 335.
518 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (concluding that, in light of
common law remedies, a hearing is not needed before corporal punishment in schools); Parratt
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created post-deprivation process proves sufficient. Hence, in Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, Inc., the Court ruled that misbranded drugs could be summarily
seized in light of detailed post-deprivation processes spelled out in the federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 5 19 In Fahey v. Mallonee, the Court similarly held
that bank assets could be summarily seized by federal officials pending a
hearing.520
These cases recognize that either the necessity of quick action by the State or the
impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when
coupled with the availability of some meaningful means by which to assess the
propriety of the State's action at some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process.52 1
Cases like Ewing and Fahey create categorical exceptions to the general pre-
deprivation process requirement. The Court did not ask whether particular facts or
circumstances prevented prior hearings.522 Because federal statutes authorized
summary seizures across-the-board, 523 the Supreme Court's analyses and
conclusions were likewise broad. The Court concluded that temporary seizures of
drugs and bank assets, respectively, were always valid, so long as they were
followed by the procedures prescribed.524
This does not mean that exceptions to pre-deprivation process are always
categorical. Sometimes only fact-specific exceptions-requiring that government
officials prove "necessity" or "emergency" in each case-have been recognized.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property is illustrative. 525 There,
federal officials used a warrant to seize real estate they believed was connected
with illicit drugs. Because they had complied with the Fourth Amendment, the
officials first argued there was no need to analyze the case under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.526 The Court disagreed. Unlike criminal
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981) (holding that common law tort remedies satisfy procedural
due process when wrong is "random and unauthorized").
519 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (holding that drugs can
be summarily seized and destroyed).
520 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (holding that bank assets can summarily
seized).
521 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981) (holding that post-deprivation remedies
can satisfy procedural due process when the wrong is "random and unauthorized").
522 Ewing, 339 U.S. at 596; Fahey, 332 U.S. at 253-54.
523 Fahey, 332 U.S. at 250-54.
524 Ewing, 339 U.S. at 600; Fahey, 332 U.S. at 250-54.
525 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (holding that
summary seizure of real estate in the absence of exigent circumstances violates procedural due
process).
526 Id. at 49.
[Vol. 65: 913
PRE-DEPRIVAT7ONPROCESS
cases, where the Fourth Amendment's procedural requirements are exclusive, 527
the Court ruled that both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to
forfeitures.528 In fact, the Fourteenth Amendment, it concluded, demands
more.
529
Applying the Mathews balancing test, the Court in Good first found that the
nature of the private right involved, control over one's home, "is a private interest
of historic and continuing importance." 530 Next, noting that forfeiture often turns
on the owner's innocence, the Court found that uncontested, ex parte hearings
(and the seizures that ensue) present an unacceptably large risk of error. Unlike
misbranded drugs and bank failures, which present relatively objective problems,
a home owner's subjective innocence is often difficult to assess. 531 "Moreover,
the availability of a postseizure hearing ... [g]iven the congested civil dockets in
federal courts ... may not [materialize] ... until many months after the
seizure." 532 Return of the property at this late juncture, "coming months after the
seizure, 'would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hearing might
have prevented."' 533
Turning to the government's concerns, the Court rejected the claim that the
balance under Mathews hinged on the government's "general interest in forfeiting
property. '534 The government's interest, it concluded, was in "seizing real
property before the forfeiture hearing. '535 By focusing on timing as opposed to
substance, the Court shifted the inquiry to whether less restrictive alternatives
existed for securing potentially forfeitable property. "In the usual case," the Court
observed, "the Government ... has various means, short of seizure, to protect its
legitimate interests in forfeitable real property. '536 Only in unusual situations,
those where government can establish that "less restrictive measures-i.e., a lis
527 See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
528 Good, 510 U.S. at 43-44.
529 Good, 510 U.S. at 52. See supra notes 298-348 and accompanying text (arguing that
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to rescues and that their standards might
vary).
530 Good, 510 U.S. at 53-54.
531 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) ("The ex
parte preseizure proceeding affords little or no protection to the innocent owner.").
532 Id. at 56
533 Id.
534 Id.
535Id.
136 Id. at 59. Contrast forfeitures of personal property, which commonly are met by
exigent circumstances, such as a likelihood of removal from the jurisdiction, surreptitious
transfer, or ultimate destruction. These possibilities justify warrantless seizures of personal
property outside the home under almost all circumstances. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559
(1999) (holding that warrantless seizure of car connected to crime satisfies Fourth
Amendment).
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pendens, restraining order, or bond-would not suffice to protect the
Government's interests in preventing the sale, destruction, or continued unlawful
use of the real property," 537 are ex parte proceedings appropriate. In the absence
of these specific "exigent circumstances, '538 full pre-deprivation process is still
the rule.
Good's logic points to a similar conclusion in the context of child abuse.
Parents plainly have important rights at stake. Government's interest, meanwhile,
is not generally protecting children. Rather, its interest (for purposes of Mathews'
balancing test) lies in protecting children in the short time before a termination or
shelter hearing can be held. As in Good, government has a variety of mechanisms
at its disposal to monitor child safety short of summary removal. Where flight or
imminent abuse is threatened, ex parte process can be used. Interviews and home
inspections can ensure safety in many instances.
In either case, whether temporary shelter or a permanent termination of
parental rights, parental fault is the paramount concem. As the Court observed in
Good, fault and innocence are not easily established.539 Summary process has a
large margin of error in this context. Given the magnitude of the temporary harm,
which can never be cured, government ought to explore other means, short of
summary rescue, to protect children while tennination is pending. Indeed, Good
indicates that government should apply for prior judicial assistance whenever
possible. 540 It should act summarily only when absolutely necessary, and only
when specific facts truly point to an emergency.
Good, of course, goes so far as to require prior contested hearings whenever
possible. 54 1 While this conclusion seems generally agreeable in the child abuse
context, the risk of parents' flight following notice-which is rarely a problem in
the context of real estate forfeitures-may sometimes excuse the need for
contested hearings. Under these circumstances, ex parte hearings are all that can
be expected. Without delving into precisely when ex parte hearings are enough, it
is sufficient here to state that some form of prior judicial process is generally
necessary to satisfy due process. Only specific, emergent circumstances can
justify summary rescue. When time reasonably suffices-that is, a reasonable
person would believe that prior judicial authorization would not jeopardize the
safety of the child-court orders should be sought.
537 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993).
538 Id.
539 Id. at 56.
540 Id. at 58.
541 Id. at 53.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Everyone agrees that children should be protected. The question is how best
to protect. For unknown and innumerable reasons, parents sometimes abuse their
children. That fact is beyond doubt. Often forgotten, however, is that
governmental intrusions also injure children. Removal in many instances causes
severe psychological and emotional trauma. In others, removal leads to physical
institutional abuse. Rather than a panacea, rescue can be an affliction all by itself.
Society embraces the fact that most-indeed, a vast majority of-children are
better off in the care of their parents. Parents have biological and emotional
incentives to protect their offspring, feelings that are not naturally shared by
strangers and governments. Like it or not, government is simply not as good at
protecting children as are parents. Even if it were, government would not be
financially capable of caring for all children. Parental care is both a reality and a
necessity.
This Article is not designed to resolve the age-old dilemma of what justifies
governmental intervention into familial affairs. My objective is more limited. I
offer only advice on how governmental intervention should proceed. Given the
natural presumption favoring parental discretion and government's bounded role,
it seems that interdiction should be exceptional, focused, and certain. Even when
horrific allegations are made against parents-like those made against John
Doe542-families should enjoy a presumption of regularity. Proof of abuse must
rise above the conjecture and hysteria that often accompany charges of sexual
molestation. Factual circumstances ought to at least convince a neutral magistrate
that drastic action is warranted.
I recognize that the post-deprivation model endorsed by several states, 543
including Florida, has emotional appeal. Concerns over structural principles are
easily dismissed in favor of child safety. "Protect the child" is an irresistible
mantra. Rescue, however, has risks. It inflicts pain and causes enormous
suffering. It has an ambiguous past that instills pride in few Americans.544 Even
in today's enlightened environment, the merits of governmental intrusion are
hotly debated.545 Rather than an "all costs" moral imperative, I see rescue and
removal as medicines best prescribed in relatively small doses.
History, corroborated by Florida's recent experience, teaches that executive
power seldom limits itself. Police officers abide by the Fourth Amendment
because they risk exclusion of evidence in criminal courts. Were it not for this
542 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
543 See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
544 See supra notes 179-255 and accompanying text.
545 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 13; Richman, supra note 65; Chill, supra note 39.
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possibility, 546 police searches would surely exceed present bounds. The same
holds for social workers in child abuse cases. Faced with no need for prior judicial
approval, no exclusionary rule,547 and little chance of being held personally liable
should probable cause prove lacking, 548 case workers have little incentive to
exercise caution. In the absence of a genuine threat of personal liability, pre-
rescue review would appear to offer the only viable deterrent.
I recognize that pre-rescue process is not cost-free. Due process can be
expensive. Putting dollars and cents aside, due process can also be expected to
sometimes, but not always, 549 delay the rescue of an abused or neglected child.
When this happens-and when the resulting delay causes more or aggravated
abuse-both the abused child and society suffer. This potential combination's
likelihood, however, is too easily overstated. Dispensing with Florida's warrant
546 Unfortunately, it appears that in terms of searches and seizures this is the only true
deterrent. Police officers are rarely held civilly liable for violating the Fourth Amendment. See
Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. L. REv. 1297,
1311-12 (2000) (describing the many problems with recovering money damages from police
officers for unlawful arrests).
547 The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule generally has no application in civil
matters, see LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 18, at 119 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does not apply to deportation proceeding)),
including those involving a termination of parental rights. See Ellen Marcus, Crack Babies and
the Constitution: Ruminations About Addicted Pregnant Women After Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 47 VILE. L. REv. 299, 330 n.182 (2002) ("even though a civil abuse and neglect
action can result in a criminal prosecution for child abuse, it would probably not trigger the
exclusionary rule").
548 The District Court in Doe, remember, found "arguable probable cause" to justify the
children's removal. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. The Eleventh Circuit went
so far as to find actual probable cause, without any factfinding whatsoever. See supra note 130
and accompanying text. Like Florida's reviewing courts, see supra notes 79-82 and
accompanying text, federal courts in Florida rarely conclude that probable cause was lacking in
the child abuse contect. Indeed, courts in Florida are loath to impose liability on social workers
even when the social workers manufacture false evidence. See, e.g., Stark v. McClenathan, 866
So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming without opinion trial court's award of absolute
immunity to social worker who allegedly manufactured evidence to justify rescue of child)
(briefs on file with author). See also Johnson v. Sackett, 793 So. 2d 20, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that social worker was entitled to absolute immunity). This is not to say that all
states and circuits are as reticent as Florida and the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., Snell v. Tunnell,
920 F.2d 673, 701 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that social worker who falsely represented facts in
affidavit can be held personally liable). The point is that official liability in rescue cases is rare.
See also Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that officials who
unconstitutionally rescued child were entitled to qualified immunity); Roska v. Peterson, 328
F.3d 1230, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003) (remanding qualified immunity issue to trial court after
concluding rescue was unconstitutional).
549 When time is plentiful, as in Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003)
(described supra notes 93-131), resort to pre-deprivation judicial process will not delay rescue
at all.
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requirement, for example, would not have hastened Kayla McKean's rescue nor
saved her life.550 Kayla was murdered, after all, not because Florida officials were
delayed in seeking a warrant, but because they did not act at all.55 1 In those
instances where delay would appear unreasonably risky, moreover, summary
action is appropriate under the exigent circumstances exception. Harm to children
thus should rarely be directly attributable to delay caused by a warrant
requirement. 552
This is not to say that delay or, more likely, an inability to obtain warrants
(because probable cause is lacking) can not facilitate harm to children. I suspect
police would uncover more crime if they were not constrained by the
Constitution. Likewise, investigators are likely to uncover and prevent more
abuse if they are given a free rein to search for and seize children. These costs,
however, must be balanced against the injuries risked by haste and license. On
balance, a proper accommodation dispenses with pre-deprivation process only
when absolutely necessary. Faced with exigencies, immediate rescue is in order.
Although an ex ante process requirement risks some harm, so does its ex post
counterpart. Unfortunately, calculating which harm is more severe and ought to
be avoided is an intractable task. The better course is to follow the teachings of
history, which indicate that pre-deprivation process offers the wiser course.
550 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
551 See Fetcher, supra note 56.
552 Florida's Child Abuse Death Review Team reported in 2003 that 124 children were
killed in Florida under abusive circumstances during the four-year period beginning in 1999
and ending in 2002. See Florida Child Abuse Death Review Team, Florida Child Abuse Death
Review: Fourth Annual Report, Florida Dep't of Health at ii
(http://www.doh.state.fl.us/cms/CADR/2003CADRrpt.pdf) (Dec. 2003). Because the report's
data included only children who had prior involvement with child protection services, the total
number of abusive deaths reported was likely quite low. Id. at iii-iv. Consequently, it is clear
that a substantial number of children in Florida are suffering serious abuse. This does not mean,
however, that a warrant requirement will exacerbate the problem. The report also surmised that
twenty percent of the deaths were simply not preventable. Id. at 3. This means that under either
pre- or post-deprivation process models, nothing could be done to save the children. As for the
other eighty percent, most had several "risk factors present at the time of death." Id. at ii. These
risk factors, according to the report, put either DCF or others on notice that problems existed
with these children. As with Kayla McKean, the ultimate problem in these instances thus was
not delay, it was not acting at all. Of course, this limited data does not include the many children
who were killed without any prior involvement with Florida's child protection services.
Whether a warrant requirement would have increased or decreased the number is unknown.
One commentator has suggested that Florida's "take-the-child-and-run mentality, combined
with what was formerly known as the Kayla McKean law, set off a foster care panic and made
children less safe." Death Team Report Shows Failure of 'Take-the-Child-and-Run'Approach
to Child Welfare, According to Advocacy Group, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Jan. 3, 2003, 2003 WL
3726585 (citation omitted). "Even as they tore more children from homes that were safe or
could have been made safe with the right kinds of help, they left other children in homes that
were dangerous." Id.
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